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As described in section I, in 2020, while the Council did not determine the existence of new threats to international peace and security or acts of aggression, it considered that the unprecedented extent of the COVID-19 pandemic was likely to endanger the maintenance of international peace and security. Throughout the reporting period, the Council also reaffirmed that the situations in Afghanistan, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan (including Abyei), and Yemen continued to constitute threats to regional and/or international peace and security. In connection with the situation in the Syrian Arab Republic, the Council maintained its determination that the devastating humanitarian situation in the country continued to constitute a threat to peace and security in the region.

With respect to specific countries and regions, the Council recalled past determinations of threats to international peace and security of significance in those situations. For example, in relation to Libya, the Council reaffirmed its determination that terrorism, in all forms and manifestations, constituted one of the most serious threats to peace and security. In connection with the situation in Somalia, the Council reiterated that the incidents of piracy and armed robbery at sea off the coast of Somalia, as well as the activity of pirate groups in Somalia, were an important factor exacerbating the situation in Somalia, which continued to pose a threat to international peace and security. The Council further expressed concern regarding the threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region posed by Al-Shabaab, including through its increased use of improvised explosive devices, and condemned the supply of weapons and ammunition supplies to and through Somalia as a serious threat to peace and stability in the region

the COVID-19 pandemic to become a threat to international peace and security or exacerbate other security threats and the issue of conflict-related sexual violence as a threat to international peace and security.

During the period under review, the Council did not issue any provisional measures under Article 40 of the Charter.

As covered in section III, during the period under review, the Council renewed the existing sanctions measures concerning the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Libya, Mali, Somalia, South Sudan, Yemen, and the Taliban and associated individuals and entities. The Council modified the list of exemptions to the arms embargo on the Central African Republic as well as certain provisions regarding exemptions to the measures concerning the arms embargo on Somalia. Regarding the sanctions measures concerning Libya, the Council modified the designation period of vessels designated pursuant to resolution 2146 (2014) from 90 days to one year

Korea, Guinea-Bissau, Iraq, Lebanon, or the Sudan, nor to those concerning the Islamic State in -Qaida and associates. As far as judicial measures were concerned, no action was taken in 2020.

As described in section IV, the Council reiterated authorizations granted prior to 2020 to United Nations peacekeeping missions and multinational forces to use force under Chapter VII of the Charter, with regard to the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Central African Republic, the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Lebanon, Libya, Mali, Somalia, the Sudan and South Sudan (including Abyei and Darfur). In that regard, the Council renewed the authorization on the use of force to discharge the protection-of-civilians mandate of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA), the United Nations Organization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon (UNIFIL), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA), the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), and the United Nations Mission in South Sudan (UNMISS). Moreover, the Council reiterated the authorization granted to the French forces in the Central

Decision and date	*Provision*
Resolution 2550 (2020) 12 November 2020	Recognizing that the current situation in Abyei and along the border between Sudan and South Sudan continues to constitute a threat to international peace and security (last preambular paragraph)
The situation in Somalia	
Resolution 2551 (2020) 12 November 2020	Condemning Al-Shabaab attacks in Somalia and beyond, expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continues to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, particularly through its increased use of improvised explosive devices (F3/od th-6(f-3(y)-v)7(( )] TJE(0)

Decision and date	*Provision*
	ensuring that the territory of Afghanistan should not be used by Al-Qaida, ISIL or other international terrorist groups to threaten or attack any other country, and that neither the Taliban nor any other Afghan group or individual should support terrorists operating on the territory of any country (ninth

linkages between terrorism and organized crime,[13] illicit transfer and accumulation of small arms and light weapons[14] and proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.[15]

In 2020, the Council also discussed threats to international peace and security in the context of country- or region-specific situations and conflicts. In connection with the situation in the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela, Council members and other Member States deliberated on whether the circumstances affecting the country constituted a threat to international peace and security.[16] In addition, during various meetings and videoconferences in 2020, Council members considered the Israeli annexation plans of parts of the West Bank and their potential ramifications for regional and international peace and
in the Middle East, including the Palestinian question , as described in case 4.

Case1
Maintenance of international peace and security

During a high-level open videoconference held on 2 July 2020 under the above-referenced
- at the initiative of Germany, which held the Presidency for the month,[17] Council members heard briefings by the Secretary-General and the President of the International Committee of the Red Cross. All Council members delivered statements during the videoconference, and delegations of various non-Council members submitted written statements.[18]

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13 S/2020/791.
14 S/PV.8713.
15 - S/2020/1324;

HIV/AIDS, and resolution 2177 (2014), which had determined that Ebola was a threat to world security. The representative of Armenia recognized that global health risks could undermine peace and security, in particular in regions already affected by conflicts and humanitarian crises, and also recalled resolution 2177 (2014) which had referred to the unprecedented extent of the Ebola outbreak in Africa constituting a threat to international peace and security. The delegation of Canada also recalled the Council responses to HIV/AIDS and Ebola and emphasized that the COVID-19 pandemic was a multifaceted threat that had significant international peace and security consequences, with sweeping implications for the Council. The delegation further underscored that the Council must focus more attention on global health security, and that additional briefings on the implications of global health security challenges on international peace and security should be considered. The delegation of Mexico recalled that in recent years, the Council had explored various aspects of emerging challenges to international peace and security, including the health crises caused by HIV/AIDS and the Ebola virus disease, including its determination in 2014 that the Ebola outbreak in West Africa constituted a threat to international peace and security. Among the elements that had led to the determination of the health crises caused by HIV/AIDS and the Ebola virus disease as threats to international peace and security had been such considerations as the rapid spread of the virus and its mortality rate, the inability of health systems to react in a timely manner

The representative of the Netherlands also referred to the determination by the Council in resolution 2177 (2014) that the 4.8sad[4.8sa)4(d[4.8sa)4wl1 0 0 612 792 reW*nBT Tf1 0 0 1 64e)4(rla)5(nds a)3(lso r)-9(e)4

COVID-19 pandemic. The representative of Spain underscored that the open videoconference had come at an exceptional time during the efforts to overcome a global pandemic with multidimensional effects. The representative pointed out that the impact of the pandemic had increased the risk of tension, conflict and division, and called on the Council to play a key role in [redacted] to peace and security. He also urged UN peacekeeping missions to be equipped with the material and human resources, especially adequate protection officers, necessary to provide agile support to local communities in responding to health threats.

The representative of Kenya suggested that existing fragility and conflict situations were

impact in fragile and conflict-affected countries, for example in the Sahel, the Horn of Africa and other regions that were in protracted conflict situations, was proof that pandemics could be an evolving threat to peace. The delegation of Malta underscored that the world had had to contend [redacted] security. The world had been rudely awakened by the fact that pandemics c TJtw for a better future, fract thahahal

needed to ensure that it did not pose yet another threat to peace processes and undermine the gains already made.

The representative of Nigeria emphasized that the crisis created by the pandemic was beyond the immediate health impact and that issues such as food insecurity, job losses and deepening inequality could intensify pre-existing social-structure challenges in countries, with the most vulnerable populations becoming more disproportionally affected. He added that in some situations, these issues created new threats to international peace and security, particularly when they took place across sensitive regional boundaries. The delegation of Guatemala underscored that pandemics could not be addressed solely as a health issue. Beyond its immediate health and humanitarian impact, COVID-19 risked deepening pre-existing social, economic and political fissures. The delegation added that the pandemic was leading to an increase in social violence and conflict, it was a threat to the achievements made in the area of international peace and security and exacerbated existing grievances and inequalities, affecting in particular the most vulnerable in conflict-affected areas. The delegati

C. References to Article 39 in communications addressed to the Security Council

During the period under review, two letters from the Permanent Representative of the Bolivarian Republic of Venezuela addressed to the President of the Security Council contained explicit references to Article 39 of the Charter. In his

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II. Provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of the situation in accordance with Article 40 of the Charter

Article 40

> *In order to prevent an aggravation of the situation, the Security Council may, before making the recommendations or deciding upon the measures provided for in Article 39, call upon the parties concerned to comply with such provisional measures as it deems necessary or desirable. Such provisional measures shall be without prejudice to the rights, claims, or position of the parties concerned. The Security Council shall duly take account of failure to comply with such provisional measures.*

Note

Section II covers the practice of the Security Council in relation to Article 40 of the Charter, regarding provisional measures to prevent an aggravation of the situation. While Article 40 suggests that provisional measures to prevent the aggravation of a conflict would be adopted prior to the imposition of measures under Chapter VII (Articles 41 and 42), the practice of the Council reflects a more flexible interpretation of that provision. Given the prolonged and rapidly changing nature of conflicts dealt with by the Council, provisional measures have been imposed in parallel to the adoption of measures under Articles 41 and 42.

During the period under review, the Council did not impose any measures pursuant to Article 40 of the Charter. There was also

be applied to the payment of funds, other financial assets or economic resources necessary to ensure the timely delivery of urgently needed humanitarian assistance.[50]

Expressing grave concern that Al-Shabaab continued to pose a serious threat to the peace, security and stability of Somalia and the region, and noting the increase in improvised explosive devices attacks by the group, the Council decided that all States should prevent the direct or indirect sale, supply or transfer of the items in part I of Annex C to resolution 2551 (2020) to Somalia from their territories or by their nationals outside their territories, or using their flag vessels or aircraft if there was sufficient evidence to demonstrate that the item(s) would be used, or a significant risk they might be used, in the manufacture in Somalia of improvised explosive devices. The items in Annex C to resolution 2551 (2020) included explosive materials, explosives precursors, explosive-related equipment, and related technology.[51] The Council further decided to renew the implementation measures related to the ban on components of improvised explosive devices.[52] While noting that the security situation in Somalia continued to necessitate the measures, including strict controls on the movement of arms, the Council affirmed that it would keep the situation in Somalia under constant review and that it would be prepared to review the appropriateness of the measures contained in resolution 2551 (2020), including any modification, possible benchmarks, suspension or lifting of the measures.[53] The Council also requested the Secretary-General to provide to the Council, no later than 15 September 2021,

ammunition management capability and recommendations to improve it further.[54]

[50] Ibid., paras 20 and 22.
[51] Ibid., sixth and tenth preambular paragraphs and para. 26.
[52] The Council decided that where an item in part I of A7.(ar)-5(ta.(r)-3(ed/c)5(e)4(.)] TJETQq0.000018243 0 612 792 reW*n EMC /Spa

Table 6
Changes to the measures imposed pursuant to Article 41 concerning Somalia, 2020

Provisions relating to sanctions measures	*Resolutions establishing measures*	*Resolutions adopted during the period (paragraph)* 2551 (2020)
Arms embargo	733 (1992), para. 5 1425 (2002), paras. 1 and 2	Extension (6) Exemption (9, 19)
Asset freeze	1844 (2008), para. 3	Extension (20) Exemption (22)
Charcoal ban	2036 (2012), para. 22	Extension (23)
IED components ban	2498 (2019), para. 26	Extension (26)
Travel ban	1844 (2008), para. 1	Extension (20)

(b) Taliban and associated individuals and entities

In 2020, the Council adopted resolution 2557 (2020), by which it reaffirmed the asset freeze, travel ban and arms embargo measures with respect to individuals and entities designated prior to the date of adoption of resolution

achieved not least by the deci

of the sanctions regime. He added that the simplif

During an open videoconference held on 19 May 2020 under the above-referenced item, Council members heard a briefing by the Acting Special Representative of the Secretary-General and Head of the United Nations Support Mission in Libya, and by the representative of Germany, in

regimes should be continually reviewed and amended, adding that her delegation looked forward to the sanctions review process later during the year, with the hope that the measures would be relaxed. The representative of Viet Nam acknowledged that the resolution recognized the achievements made by the South Sudanese parties and that it also set out a clear and specific roadmap for the review of the sanctions, particularly the arms embargo, which provided good ground for guiding the future work of the Council. Additionally, he e
that the adoption of the resolution would contribute to long-term peace and stability in South Sudan.

The three Council members that abstained on the draft resolution did not share the view that the situation in South Sudan required the application of sanctions.[117] The representative of China noted that considering that the political process towards peace in South Sudan had recently made significant progress and that the security situation in the country had also greatly improved, the Council should have sent positive messages, including setting a clear timetable for the lifting of the sanctions measures. Similarly, in its statement, the delegation of the Russian Federation explained that the proposed text of the resolution did not reflect the reality on the ground, as the current situation in South Sudan saw a sustainable trend towards stabilization. According to the statement, it was regional mediators and not sanctions that played the key role, adding that at some point the arms embargo did not let the

situation remained challenging. He added that the mandate renewal had provided an opportunity that should have been used to update the relevant sanctions measures in light of the developments on the ground to help Somalia build greater security capacity in the service of the reconstruction process. Instead, the current embargo had been a serious impediment to the enhanced security capacity of the Somali Government, and resolution 2551 (2020) had failed to duly respond to the strong desire of the Somali Government to have the arms embargo lifted.

T

the Charter by which it authorized peacekeeping missions and multinational forces, including those deployed by regional organizations, to use

for the maintenance or restoration of international peace and security.

For information on the authorization of the use of force of missions in the past, including some of the missions covered below, see previous supplements. For further information on the specific mandates of each field mission, see part X of the present Supplement.

In 2020, the Council reiterated its authorization to use force in relation to various situations and disputes. In Africa, in relation to the situation in the Central African Republic, the Council renewed the authorization to the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic ate within its capabilities and areas of deployment,[122]

operational support to the Mission when under serious threat.[123]

In Europe, in relation to the situation in Bosnia and Herzegovina, the Council renewed its authorization to Member States, under the European Union Force-Althea (EUFOR-Althea) and the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NA to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the Peace Agreement.[138] The Council also authorized Member States , at the request of either EUFOR-Althea or NATO, in the defense of the EUFOR-Althea or NATO presence, respectively; and recognized the right of both EUFOR-Althea and NATO to take all necessary measures to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack.[139]

In the Middle East, in connection with the situation in Lebanon, the Council recalled its authorization to the United Nations Interim Force in Lebanon
of deployment of its forces, to ensure that its area of operations was not utilized for hostile activities, to resist attempts by forceful means to prevent it from discharging its duties, to protect United Nations personnel, facilities, installations and equipment, ensure the security and freedom of movement of United Nations personnel and humanitarian workers, and to protect civilians under imminent threat of physical violence.[140]

B. Discus920n[(-)] TJ ET Q q (n wor3(ies, ins000008fLe)3g bo) ET Q q (n w6. ET BDC q 00000 E

mandate.[141] Similarly, the representative of Viet Nam, with regard to the role of host countries, stressed that peace operations must be carried out in accordance with the basic principles of political impartiality, consent of the parties and non-use of force except in self-defence and defence of the mandate. He added that the promotion and protection of human rights remained primary responsibilities of host countries and therefore peace operations should support the host countries in undertaking those responsibilities with a constructive approach based on the aforementioned principles and an awareness of the economic, social and cultural context of local societies. The representative of Brazil argued that when it came to advancing human rights, the use of force must never be used except as a last resort. He further underlined that overusing force under the pretext of protecting human rights could compromise the credibility and legitimacy of peacekeeping missions and damage the fundamental principles of peacekeeping. He noted that peacekeeping operations should above all make full use of peaceful measures, such as strengthening cooperation within civil-military coordination cells and human rights components in order to establish links with the local popula

concerns. The delegation of India underscored the need for United Nations personnel engaged in peace operations to be adequately trained and prepared to respond appropriately to human rights violations and abuses in accordance with their mandate and their competence, stressing that the use of force must be employed in accordance with necessity and proportionality and, above all, without endangering the cardinal principle of impartiality.

[141] See S/2020/674.

V. Consideration of Articles 43 to 45 of the Charter

Article 43

1. All Members of the United Nations, in order to contribute to the mai8m0tnitethtribute to the mai8n

Note

Under Article 43 of the Charter, all Member States undertake to make available to the Security Council, for the maintenance of international peace and security, armed forces, assistance and facilities in accordance with special agreements. Such agreements, to be entered into by the Council and Member States, were conceived to regulate the numbers and types of troops, their readiness and location and the nature of facilities to be provided.

No agreements under Article 43 were ever concluded, however, and in the absence of such agreements, there is therefore no practice in application of Article 43. The United Nations has developed practical arrangements to carry out military operations in the absence of such agreements. In that context, the Council authorises peacekeeping forces (under the command and control of the Secretary-General and assembled pursuant to ad hoc agreements entered into by the United Nations and Member States), and national or regional forces (under national or regional command and control) to conduct military action. Peacekeeping operations, as well as their mandates, are covered in detail in part X of the present Supplement.

Articles 44 and 45 of the Charter contain explicit references to Article 43 and are therefore intimately linked. As with Article 43, there is no practice in application of Articles 44 and 45. Nonetheless, the Council has developed, through its decisions, a practice by which to (a) call on Member States to contribute armed forces, assistance and facilities, including rights of passage, (b) consult with Member States contributing troops for United Nations peacekeeping activities and (c) call on Member States to contribute military air assets in the context of peacekeeping. Some of those decisions of the Council are also featured in section VII of this part, which relates to Article 48, to the extent that they concern actions required to carry out decisions of the Council for the maintenance of international peace and security.

During the period under review, in its decisions, the Council called for the provision of troops and other military assistance, including air assets, to the African Union Mission in Somalia (AMISOM), the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in the Central African Republic (MINUSCA) and the United Nations MultidimensionET0 G[7i3e/F1 G[()] TJETQ EMC g0 G0

addressed the need for providing additional troops and military equipment to peacekeeping operations to ensure effective mandate implementation. Throughout 2020, the Council also adopted decisions in which it emphasized, and held meetings and videoconferences at which participants deliberated upon, the importance of consulting troop- and police-contributing countries on issues pertaining to the mandates of peacekeeping operations. Set out below is an overview of the practice of the Council during 2020 concerning the need for Member States to contribute, support and provide assistance to peacekeeping operations (subsection A) and the need for consultation with troop and police contributing countries (subsection B).

A. Need for Member States to contribute, support and provide assistance, including military air assets, to peacekeeping operations

In 2020, the Council made no explicit reference

deployment, calling on Members States to provide troops with the minimum of declared caveats to MINUSMA.[145] By a presidential statement issued on 15 October 2020, the Council again called on Member States to consider additional contributions to MINUSMA to provide the key assets, capabilities and troops needed for better protection of civilians.[146]

By resolution 2552 (2020) of 12 November 2020, the Council reiterated its concern at the capabilities and troops needed for

the risk of both peacekeeper and civilian casualties and supported a narrative of peacekeeping

stressed that all that would not have been possible without the continued support of Member States, and urged troop- and police-contributing countries to continue to come forward with pledges. He further underlined the importance of having the right equipment in the right place at the right time, with the right know-how and added that contingent-owned equipment was key in that regard. With regard to MINUSMA, he thanked the Member States that had made specialized capability pledges to the Mission and encouraged others to do the same.[151] Commenting on mission performance, the representative of Dominican Republic stressed the need to share intelligence and to reduce the gaps in essential equipment, which would translate into greater security and staff performance. The representative of Estonia said that his country expected the strengthening of the comprehensive performance assessment system and predeployment visits to continue. He added that in Mali, for example, there was a need for increasingly mobile, flexible and robust troop postures and stronger early warning systems, and those relied on ensuring that the troops deployed had adequate training and equipment, but also the capabilities necessary to fulfil their mandate. The representative of France underscored that in order to perform well, peacekeeping operations should be capable of adapting to changes on the ground, which required the development of rapid deployment battalions, as had been done in the Democratic Republic of the Congo, in order to react as quickly as possible to increased tensions. That also involved improving equipment, filling capacity gaps, improving casualty evacuation procedures and adapting deployments on the ground, as seen in the Central African Republic and Mali in the context of the adaptation plan for MINUSMA. The representative of the United States said that her country recognized that missions should have the necessary resources and capabilities to fully carry out their mandated tasks in complex, fragile environments, and while robust training and equipment were necessary, they were not sufficient alone, to improve performance. They needed to be backed by a commitment to the mission and sustained by a culture of performance and accountability.

partnerships in peacekeeping operations and, in that regard, emphasized the need for the Council, the Secretariat, financial contributors and troop- and police-contributing countries to strengthen their communication and carry out in-depth discussions through existing mechanisms, such as meetings with troop- and police-contributing countries and Council peacekeeping working groups, in order to create synergy for peacekeeping reforms.[158] The representative of the Russian Federation underscored that any changes related to troop rotations should be implemented in close cooperation with troop-contributing countries. She also said that her country considered it extremely important to take into account the views of the host States and troop-contributing countries when considering issues concerning the extension of mandates and to consult with them when preparing recommendations for assessment reports on the effectiveness of the work of peacekeeping missions. She further stressed the need to further improve the trilateral cooperation among the Council, troop- and police-contributing countries and the Secretariat in order to strengthen the spirit of partnership, cooperation and mutual trust.

In addition, during the period under review, Council members and other participants at Council meetings and videoconferences stressed the need for the Council to listen to the views of troop- and police-contributing countries to UNISFA[159] and UNIFIL.[160] With respect to the United Nations Organization Stabilization Mission in the Democratic Republic of the Congo (MONUSCO), at the 8778th meeting held on 7 December 2020, the representative of France noted that discussions were being held among contributing countries and the Secretariat, which was expected to facilitate the prompt enactment of the decisions taken by the Council.[161] The representative of Indonesia emphasized that multi-spectrum challenges that the Democratic Republic of the Congo was facing required close cooperation from all stakeholders. She added that her country continued to call for more robust consultation with neighbours and regional organizations, as well as with the troop- and police-contributing countries to MONUSCO. The representative of the Russian Federation said that any decisions regarding the configuration of MONUSCO, including the Force Intervention Brigade, should take into account the situation on the ground and thoroughly consider the priorities of Kinshasa and the troop-contributing countries. In a

[158] See S/2020/911.
[159] See S/2020/351

similar vein, the representative of China underscored that any plan for the reform of MONUSCO and its Force Intervention Brigade should be adequately communicated to the troop- and police-contributing countries and be carried out at a steady pace.

VI. Role and composition of the Military Staff Committee in accordance with Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter

Article 46

Plans for the application of armed force shall be made by the Security Council with the assistance of the Military Staff Committee.

Article 47

1. There shall be established a Military Staff Committee to advise and assist the Security Council on all questions relating to the Security Council's military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security, the employment and command of forces placed at its disposal, the regulation of armaments, and possible disarmament.

2. The Military Staff Committee shall consist of the Chiefs of Staff of the permanent members of the Security Council or their representatives. Any Member of the United Nations not permanently represented on the Committee shall be invited by the Committee to be associated with it when the efficient discharge of the Committee's responsibilities requires the participation of that Member in its work.

3. The Military Staff Committee shall be responsible under the Security Council for the strategic direction of any armed forces placed at the disposal of the Security Council. Questions relating to the command of such forces shall be worked out subsequently.

4. The Military Staff Committee, with the authorization of the Security Council and after consultation with appropriate regional agencies, may establish regional sub-committees.

Note

Section VI covers the practice of the Security Council under Articles 46 and 47 of the Charter regarding the Military Staff Committee, including instances in which the Council considered the role of the Military Staff Committee in planning the application of armed force, and in advising and assisting the Council on the military requirements for the maintenance of international peace and security.

During the period under review, the Council did not explicitly refer to either Article 46 or Article 47 in any of its decisions. Articles 46 and 47 were also not referred to in any of the

.

As is customary, the annual report of the Council to the General Assembly issued during the reporting period made reference to the activities of the Military Staff Committee.[162]

[162] See A/75/2, part IV.

VII. Action required of Member States under Article 48 of the Charter

Article 48

1. The action required to carry out the decisions of the Security Council for the maintenance of international peace and security shall be taken by all the Members of

into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions of the Council requiring Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 41. Subsection B covers decisions of the Council requiring Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 42. During 2020, no references to Article 48 were found in communications to the Council nor was there any discussion held in relation to the interpretation or application of that Article.

A. Decisions of the Security Council requiring Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 41 of the Charter

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In 2020, the Council adopted a number of decisions regarding measures adopted in accordance with Article 41. With regard to judicial measures adopted under that article, the Council continued to urge all States, especially States where fugitives were suspected of being at large, to render Tm0 g(susuu2(e)4(c)-5(e)4(slar)5y(a)4ussi)-3(s)-3(t)-3(a)4(n)-3(c)-3(e)4, to Tq0.00000912 0 612 792 reW*nBT/F1

. ingw(it)-3(h(c)4(ocr)4(e)4rn, th)84(a)4(oit)-3(he)4(Mpe)3(c)4h(a)4(ism)-4( )] TJETQ 64.8 121.67436092 13.92 refq0.000

Concerning the situation in Somalia, the Council called on the Federal Government of Somalia to continue working with Somali financial authorities, private sector financial institutions and the international community to identify, assess and mitigate money laundering and terrorist financing risks, improve compliance and strengthen supervision and enforcement, and requested the Federal Government of Somalia, the United Nations Office on Drugs and Crime and the Panel of Experts on Somalia to continue exchanging information about Al-
continue working with stakeholders to develop a plan to disrupt Al- .[178] The Council also requested the Federal Government of Somalia to strengthen cooperation and coordination with other Member States and international partners to prevent and counter the financing of terrorism, and to submit an update on specific actions taken in that regard.[179] The Council reaffirmed that all States were to implement a general and complete embargo on all deliveries of weapons and military equipment to Somalia, including prohibiting the financing of all acquisitions and deliveries of weapons and military equipment and the direct or indirect supply of technical advice, financial and other a

arms embargo imposed therein.[189] The Council further urged all parties, all Member States, and international, regional and subregional organizations, to ensure cooperation with the Panel of Experts, and urged all Member States involved to ensure the safety of the members of the Panel and unhindered access, in particular to persons, documents and sites.[190]

With respect to measures adopted under Article 41 for the purpose of preventing and suppressing the financing of terrorism, the Council noted with grave concern that terrorists and terrorist groups, including in Africa, raised, moved and transferred funds through a variety of means, and recalled the relevant obligations on all Member States in that regard, including those in resolutions 1373 (2001) and 2178 (2014).[191] The Council also continued to encourage all Member States to more actively submit to the Committee listing requests of individuals, groups, undertakings and entities that met the listing criteria contained in paragraph 2 of resolution 2368 (2017) and to submit additional identifying and other information set out in paragraph 85 of that same resolution.[192]

B. Decisions of the Security Council requiring Member States to carry out action in relation to measures under Article 42 of the Charter

During the period under review, the Council urged, called upon and requested action by a particular Member State, a designated group of Member States, all Member States, all parties in relation to measures adopted under Article 42 of the Charter.

With respect to the situation in Abyei, the Council called upon all Member States, in particular Sudan and South Sudan, to provide for the free, unhindered and expeditious movement, to and from Abyei and throughout the Safe Demilitarized Border Zone, of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, including vehicles, aircraft, and spare parts, which are for the exclusive and official use of the United Nations Interim Security Force for Abyei (UNISFA).[193] Expressing disappointment that the Governments of Sudan and South Sudan continued to obstruct the

two countries provide full support to UNISFA in the deployment of its personnel, including by

[189] Resolution 2511 (2020), twelfth preambular paragraph.
[190] Ibid., para. 10.

Lebanon to facilitate prompt and full access requested by UNIFIL, including all relevant locations north of the Blue Line related to the discovery of tunnels crossing the Blue Line which UNIFIL reported as a violation of resolution 1701 (2006).[201] The Council further called on all States to fully support and respect the establishment between the Blue Line and the Litani River of an area free of any armed personnel, assets and weapons other than those of the Government of Lebanon and UNIFIL.[202] The Council also urged the Government of Israel to expedite the withdrawal of its army from northern Ghajar without further delay in coordination with UNIFIL.[203]

In connection with the situation in Mali, the Council called upon Member States, especially those in the region, to ensure the free, unhindered and expeditious movement to and from Mali of all personnel, as well as equipment, provisions, supplies and other goods, which were for the exclusive and official use of the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA)

IX. Special economic problems of the nature described in Article 50 of the Charter

Article 50

If preventive or enforcement measures against any state are taken by the Security Council, any other state, whether a Member of the United Nations or not, which finds itself confronted with special economic problems arising from the carrying out of those measures shall have the right to consult the Security Council with regard to a solution of those problems.

Note

Section IX covers the practice of the Security Council in relation to Article 50 of the Charter, regarding the right of States to consult the Council with a view to resolving economic problems arising from the implementation of preventive or enforcement measures, such as sanctions, imposed by the Council.

During the period under review, the Council continued its practice of imposing targeted instead of comprehensive economic sanctions, thereby minimizing the unintended adverse impact on third States.[221] None of the Security Council-mandated sanctions committees received formal requests for assistance under Article 50 of the Charter.

The Council did not explicitly invoke Article 50 of the Charter in any of its decisions during the reporting period. Article 50 of the Charter was also not explicitly mentioned at any meeting of the Council, nor was there any substantive discussion on the application or interpretation of the

[221] For more information on sanctions measures, see sect. III.

the United Nations and on the Strengthening of the Role of the Organization, but that did not replace the need for greater transparency and effectiveness on the part of the Council. The delegation argued that the issue was becoming even more relevant in the light of the recent increase

representative of the United Kingdom, referring to the situation in the Middle East, recalled that his he recognized the danger and threat that Iran posed to the Middle East, as well as the right to self-defence. At the same time, the United Kingdom wanted to see tensions de-escalated and find a diplomatic way through.

Several participants criticized the increasing volume of invocations of Article 51 by Member States to justify the use of force. In that regard, the representative of the Syrian Arab Republic expressed his on transparency, self-criticism and defining mistakes, so that specific threats could be dealt with seriously, at the forefront of which wa5 of force.

publicly express their legal views on each and every case could not be interpreted as a new State practice or *opinio juris* that might lead to the erosion of Article 2 (4) of the Charter.[232]

The Prime Minister of Saint Vincent and the Grenadines stated that the treasured right to self-defence could not be exercised disproportionately or outside the boundaries of international law.[233] The representative of South Africa noted that the Charter made very clear that the Council was the sole body that could authorize the use of force, and provided that States could act in self-defence, including confronting imminent threats; but that such threats needed to be credible, real and objectively verifiable for the use of force without Council authorization to be justifiable.

B. References to Article 51 and the right of self-defence in communications addressed to the Security Council

In 2020, Article 51 was explicitly invoked 23 times in 18 communications from Member States addressed to the President of the Council or circulated as a document of the Security Council. These communications concerned a variety of disputes and situations. A complete list of letters from Member States containing explicit references to Article 51 in 2020 is featured in table 14 below. Explicit references to Article 51 of the Charter were also found in two reports of the Secretary-Gene

the Islamic Republic of Iran reserved all of its rights under international law to take necessary measures, in particular in exercising its inherent right to self-defence .[236] Subsequently, on 16 January 2020 with reference to the identical letters dated 9 January 2020 from the Permanent Representative of Iraq to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General and the President of the Security Council,[237] the Permanent Representative informed the Council that I January 2020 had been a measured and proportionate response in exercising its inherent right to self-defence against an American air base from which the attack against Major General Soleimani had been launched.[238] In addition, on 15 September 2020, the Islamic Republic of Iran reiterated that it would not hesitate to exercise its inherent right to self-defence to protect its people, defend its sovereignty and territorial integrity and secure its national interests against any aggression.[239] Pakistan also submitted a communication transmitting a letter from its Minister for Foreign Affairs informing the Council that Pakistan would consistent with its right to self-defence granted under the Charter respond swiftly and effectively to the .[240] Iraq also submitted a communication, in which it called upon the Council to condemn the bombardment of Iraqi army positions and civilian installations by the United States and emphasized that there was no basis in international law for using self-defence as a justification.[241]

of Article 41 of the Charter or applied pursuant to the inherent right of self-defence;[242] Armenia also submitted several communications denouncing the alleged aggression

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