

Introductory note

Article 52

1. Nothing in the present Charter precludes the existence of regional arrangements or agencies for dealing with such matters relating to the maintenance of international peace and security as are appropriate for regional action provided that such arrangements or agencies and their activities are consistent with the Purposes and Principles of the United Nations.

2. The Members of the United Nations entering into such arrangements or constituting such agencies shall make every effort to achieve pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies before referring them to the Security Council.

3. The Security Council shall encourage the development of pacific settlement of local disputes through such regional arrangements or by such regional agencies either on the initiative of the states concerned or by reference from the Security Council.

4. This Article in no way impairs the application of Articles 34 and 35.

Article 53

1. The Security Council shall, where appropriate, utilize such regional arrangements or agencies for enforcement action under its authority. But no enforcement action shall be taken under regional arrangements or by regional agencies without the authorization of the Security Council, with the exception of measures against any enemy state, as defined in paragraph 2 of this Article, provided for pursuant to Article 107 or in regional arrangements directed against renewal of aggressive policy on the part of any such state, until such time as the Organization may, on request of the Governments concerned, be charged with the responsibility for preventing further aggression by such a state.

2. The term enemy state as used in paragraph 1 of this Article applies to any state which during the Second World War has been an enemy of any signatory of the present Charter.

Article 54

The Security Council shall at all times be kept fully informed of activities undertaken or in contemplation under regional arrangements or by regional agencies for the maintenance of international peace and security.

Charter, addressing root causes of conflict, enhancing safety and security at sea, preventing and countering terrorism and violent extremism, and building resilience to resist incitement.⁵ The Council also recognized the importance of cooperation in sustainable development, comprehensive risk assessments and risk management strategies, including poverty eradication, food security and water management, disaster risk reduction, and desertification and drought management in the Arab region.⁶ The Council emphasized the importance to strengthen trilateral cooperation and coordination between the United Nations, the African Union and the League of Arab States on cross-regional peace and security issues and encouraged consultations between them.⁷

Case 1

Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security

On 14 March, the Council held a briefing under the item entitled “Cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations in maintaining international peace and security” to discuss relations with the Collective Security Treaty Organization (CSTO).²² At the outset of the meeting, Council members were briefed by the Secretary-General of the United Nations and the Secretary-General of the CSTO.²³ In his briefing, the Secretary-General of the United Nations stated that the founders of the United Nations understood that no single organization could alone ensure peace, security and development in a complex and rapidly changing world and that this required partnership across all levels – from the local, to the regional and global.

regional and subregional organizations under Chapter VIII was conducive to strengthening the universality and effectiveness of collective security mechanisms and improving the maintenance of international peace and security. The representative of the Russian Federation, as echoed by the representative of Tajikistan, held the view that regional organizations had to complement United Nations efforts within their areas of responsibility, as they were, in most cases, more familiar with the situation on the ground. The representative of France stated that the entire point of Chapter VIII was the recognition that regional organizations were closest to the ground, the first to witness security crises and knew the deep roots involved and effective solutions to resolve and prevent them. The representative of India recalled that Article 52 of the Charter encouraged the settlement of disputes through regional arrangements and that such organizations were uniquely placed to provide better solutions to conflicts in their regions. The representative of Brazil stated that the United Nations and regional organizations should not only complement each other, but also combine efforts to develop effective tools for conflict prevention, mediation, crisis management and post-conflict peacebuilding.

Speakers also reflected on and expressed differing views on the first deployment by the CSTO of a peacekeeping force following civil unrest in Kazakhstan in January 2022. Several delegations were of the view that the CSTO played a decisive and positive role in stabilizing the situation in Kazakhstan.²⁵ The Deputy Foreign Minister of the Russian Federation and the representative of Kazakhstan emphasized that the operation, the objective of which was to provide peacekeeping assistance and maintain stability in the country, was conducted further to the request of the President of Kazakhstan and in accordance with Article 4 of the Treaty on Collective Security.

Other delegations expressed concern with the violence in Kazakhstan and maintained that regional interventions had to be conducted in full respect of human rights, fundamental freedoms and the rule of law.²⁶ The representative of the United Kingdom stressed that regional deployments had to be proportionate in any use of force and that Kazakhstan's sovereignty had to be respected, addnts /-6 (i)-6 (o)-4 (n)-4(he2.00in)(e)4ise

representative of the United States expressed concern that the CSTO deployment was sought before sustained efforts at national dialogue, reconciliation and the peaceful resolution of disputes took place. The representative of Ghana opined that closer collaboration between the United Nations and the CSTO on any future deployment would enhance the Council's accountability over actions for regional peace and security.

More generally, the representatives of France and the United Kingdom underscored that regional partnerships had to be based on the principles and purposes of the Charter. The representatives of Albania, France and the United Kingdom emphasized the need for cooperating with regional organizations, including their peacekeeping forces, to respect human rights and ensure the participation of women. The representative of Albania further stated that regional organizations should work in a transparent manner, follow clear rules and principles, and that any country must be able to decide in full freedom on the regional body it wished to join, in accordance with the aims and aspirations of its people. The representative of the United Kingdom viewed the rule of law as a key component of institutional cooperation with regional organizations, consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. In addition to democracy, human rights and the rule of law, as common objectives of cooperation, the representative of Brazil cited the promotion of peace, reconciliation, stability, freedom and economic prosperity. While noting that when there was good cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations emerging crises could be effectively contained, the representative of Kenya stated that whenever organizations "read from different scripts" or took unilateral actions,

Emirates stressed the need to adhere to the principle of seeking “Arab solutions to Arab issues”, which required an end to foreign interference in Arab affairs. The representative of the Russian Federation stated that cooperation with the League could contribute to the peaceful settlement of existing disputes without external

information between the Council and the League of Arab States.³⁴ The Minister of State of the Ministry for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation of the United Arab Emirates noted the need to institutionalize the relationship which would require establishing mechanisms for the exchange of information and viewpoints on how to address regional challenges from a realistic and practical perspective.

Several representatives called for the strengthening of the United Nations Liaison Office to the League of Arab States.³⁵

and the Council.

Further to the briefings, Council members and other Member States shared their views on the cooperation between the United Nations and regional organizations in the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, particularly with respect to securing the safe participation of women in political processes and decision-making. The Minister for Europe and Foreign Affairs of Albania stated that regional organizations had unique and complementary capacities, which when properly coordinated with the United Nations system, could produce good, fast and effective results in accelerating the implementation of the women and peace and security agenda, especially in contexts of political turmoil and the seizure of power by force. The State Secretary of Norway highlighted the importance of regional organizations carrying the weight of many and diverse voices, stating that they were key actors and partners to the United Nations in translating women and peace and security ambitions into actual impact. The representative of Mexico held the view that regional organizations were crucial in promoting political dialogue and advancing respect for human rights, including gender equality and the empowerment of women and girls. The representative and Assistant Minister for Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs of the United Arab Emirates noted that, when properly empowered and supported, regional organizations could expand and complement international practices that may overlook contexts and identities of a conflict. The representative of Brazil recalled that resolution [2242 \(2015\)](#) recognized the complementary role of regional organizations in the implementation of Council resolutions on women and peace and security and that, in recent years, the Council had strengthened dialogue with regional organizations by holding annual meetings and adopting outcome documents. Also noting their complementary role, the representative of Türkiye stated that cooperation between the United Nations and regional and subregional organizations on women and peace and security should be seen in the context of their broader cooperation on conflict prevention and the maintenance of peace and security.

Several speakers highlighted the important positive effect regional organizations had on individual Member States for advan(a)4 2 (o)2nsrtant co nrd securnr2242 (2015)

plans had a catalytic effect by encouraging the development of national action plans and that regional organizations had a convening role that had to be positively exploited. Multiple speakers further pointed out that the successful implementation of the women and peace and security agenda also required strengthening ties between regional actors themselves, including by sharing best practices.⁴³

Council members and other Member States also widely agreed about the importance for the United Nations and regional organizations to support the work of civil society organizations which promoted the political particauding

complement each other, while keeping their respective core mandates intact. The representative of Egypt stated that integration between the Security Council and the African Union Peace and Security Council required joint work and exploiting each other's comparative advantages to address conflicts, especially emerging ones. He added that establishing a hierarchy in that context did not mean that the United Nations would relinquish its responsibility as an overarching organization under the Charter.

The representative and Assistant Minister of Foreign Affairs and International Cooperation for Political Affairs of the United Arab Emirates was of the view that the Council should endorse the leadership of African regional and subregional organizations and particularly their efforts to resolve African conflicts. The representative of Norway stated that combining the situational awareness of the African Union with the mandates, tools and technical capacity of the United Nations improved conflict resolution and mediation. Furthermore, participants highlighted a range of areas of cooperation between the United Nations and African Union such as conflict prevention, early warning, mediation, peacekeeping, peacebuilding, disarmament, counter-terrorism, countering maritime piracy and security sector reform, among others. Some speakers called for the further enhancement of cooperation in addressing climate and security i(r)TJ3.5 04 (r)3 (i)-2 (c)4(c)4 (o)4 (r)3 (a)43.47 0 Td(

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called for the development of a specific United Nations programme to build the capacity of the African Union Commission and subregional organizations to

working group on preventing violent extremism and countering terrorism, which aimed to increase coordination and synergies between the two organizations and reiterated the appeal to the Council to ensure predictable funding for African Union peace operations. She further conveyed the need to put in place an innovative architecture that supported African peace operations in an effective and sustainable manner.

The Chairperson of the African Union Commission also noted that Africa was not lacking in initiatives to counter terrorism and further mentioned the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) force in Mozambique and the more recently-established East African Community regional force in eastern Democratic Republic of the Congo. While noting that the African Union had set up a peace fund to work on prevention and to support the efforts of countries that were victims of terrorist violence, he pointed to a pressing need for sustainable financial resources and technical and logistical support to sustain its efforts. The Commissioner was of the view that traditional mechanisms for responding to threats to peace, peacebuilding and peacekeeping were no longer entirely consistent with new circumstances and

~~(The author stated that the main purpose of the fund was to support the efforts of countries that were victims of terrorist violence, he pointed to a pressing need for sustainable financial resources and technical and logistical support to sustain its efforts. The Commissioner was of the view that traditional mechanisms for responding to threats to peace, peacebuilding and peacekeeping were no longer entirely consistent with new circumstances and~~

operations, United Nations missions could contribute to the protection of civilians, use of good offices, capacity-building for governance, service delivery and human rights protection. The representative of China noted that African countries had certain expectations regarding the support of United Nations peacekeeping operations for counter-terrorism and called on the Secretariat to take those concerns into

II. Recognition of the efforts of regional arrangements in the pacific settlement of disputes

Note

Table 1
Decisions concerning the pacific settlement of disputes by regional arrangements, 2022

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
Peace and security in Africa	S/PRST/2022/6		

<i>Item</i>	<i>Decision and date</i>	<i>Paragraphs</i>	<i>Regional organizations mentioned</i>
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Congo, they also discussed the regional mediation efforts, including the engagement of the East African Community, to achieve a cessation of hostilities and disarmament of armed groups through the Nairobi and Luanda Processes. Regarding Mali and the West Africa and Sahel region, Council discussions focused on the engagement of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) with transitional authorities in Burkina Faso, Guinea and Mali to ensure the holding of elections and a return to constitutional order.⁵⁶

In relation to the Sudan, Council members discussed the work of the African Union, Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD) and United Nations trilateral

peace”.⁶⁰ The Council was briefed by the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security, the Special Adviser of the Secretary-General on Africa and the Permanent Representative of Bangladesh, in his capacity as Chair of the Peacebuilding Commission.⁶¹

In his briefing, the African Union Commissioner for Political Affairs, Peace and Security stated that

exploration of further solutions for the allocation of resources and capacity-building for African countries. The representative of South Africa opined that cooperation between the African Union and the United Nations could be further streamlined and strengthened with the harmonization of activities between the African Union Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development policy and the Peacebuilding Commission, as well as the African Union liaison offices and the United Nations missions in Africa.

Speakers paid particular attention to the role of the African Union and subregional organizations in promoting good governance and preventing conflict in Africa. Specifically, the representative of Ireland noted their role in responding to coups d'état and particularly commended the preventive diplomacy of the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) and its efforts to promote dialogue, democracy, good governance and regional stability. The representative of Germany called for strengthening the vital role of the African Union

was legitimate and practical for the United Nations to allocate the necessary resources for them. The representative of Ireland stated that United Nations peacekeeping operations, in addition to European Union missions and operations, played a key role in strengthening the national security defence capacities of African partners and called on the Council to ensure that human rights due diligence policies were implemented. The representatives of Norway and Senegal expressed support for the establishment of a United Nations support office for the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel. The representative of Ghana stressed the need for the Council to determine the conditions under which African regional forces acting under Chapter VII of the Charter could meet the requirements for financing, especially from assessed contributions. The representative of the Russian Federation asserted that discussions on financing had been going on in the United Nations for many years and that, as a pretext for opposing such support, special demands were being put forward on African efforts related to human rights. The representative added that agreeing on a common African position on the modalities for financing operations and the use of the African Union Peace Fund was key. The representative of Senegal stated that the revitalization of the Peace Fund, as a mechanism for the operationalization of the African Standby Force, was essential to provide Africa with a collective, autonomous and fully operational security system.

On 31 August 2022, in connection with the same item, the Council adopted a presidential statement in which it welcomed the progress made by African countries, the African Union and subregional organizations in conflict prevention, peacema(r)3 (e4 (a)-6 (7(te)6 (me

that were authorized by the Council and, consistent with Chapter VIII of the Charter, encouraged further dialogue on options including using United Nations assessed contributions in accordance with resolution [2378 \(2017\)](#).⁶⁷

⁶⁷ Ibid., twentieth paragraph.

phase 3 (June 2024), and zero personnel, by the end of phase 4 (December 2024), and expressed its intention to authorize these reductions, taking into account the situation in Somalia and the regular joint technical assessments as outlined in the resolution.⁷⁴

Further to the joint proposal, the Council decided that ATMIS would pursue the following strategic objectives: (a) to conduct jointly-planned operations with Somali security forces to degrade Al-Shabaab and affiliates linked to the Islamic State in the Levant/Da'esh; (b) to support Somali security forces by jointly holding priority population centres and providing protection to local communities and United Nations personnel and installations, while coordinating to support the implementation of the Somalia National Stabilisation Strategy and State Stabilisation Plans; (c) to assist the Federal Government of Somalia in the implementation of stabilisation efforts for all recovered areas; (d) to support the capacity development of the Somali security forces to facilitate the progressive takeover of security responsibilities; (e) to support the Somali security forces across the clear, hold and build phases, in line with the Somalia Transition Plan and, in collaboration with Federal Government institutions, by facilitating humanitarian liaison, community engagement, as well as assisting Somali security forces with complying with international humanitarian law and international human rights law and holding accountable those responsible for violations thereof.⁷⁵

The Council underlined the need for Somalia and its partners to take a coordinated approach towards supporting Somali-led political and security reforms to enable a progressive transition of security responsibility to Somalia and requested the United Nations to establish a technical partnership coordination function to increase coordination and collaboration between the Federal Government of Somalia, federal member states, ATMIS, the United Nations Support Mission in Somalia (UNSOM), the United Nations Support Office in Somalia (UNSOS), the United Nations country team and other partners.⁷⁶ In addition, the Council requested the United Nations, jointly with the African Union, the Federal Government of Somalia, the European Union and other donors to identify relevant, clear and realistic benchmarks in order to assess the implementation of the security transition by 30 September 2022, taking into account resolution [2594 \(2021\)](#), while also requesting these actors to undertake regular, joint technical assessments of progress made to guide the Council as it further

⁷⁴ Ibid., para. 28.

⁷⁵ Ibid., para. 23 (a)-(e).

⁷⁶ Ibid., para. 48.

further reiterated its request for ATMIS to support and assist Somalia in implementing the charcoal ban and facilitate regular access for the Panel to charcoal exporting ports.⁸³

Finally, by resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council exceptionally extended its authorisations under resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) until 30 June 2023, and affirmed that paragraph 27 of that resolution, which provided for the deployment of up to 17,626 uniformed personnel from 1 January to 31 March 2023, was annulled.⁸⁴ The Council recalled the revision of the operational timeline requested by Somalia, which was supported by the African Union Peace and Security Council in its communiqué of 11 November 2022,⁸⁵ to complete the drawdown of 2,000 ATMIS personnel by 30 June 2023.⁸⁶ The Council further noted that the African Union Peace and Security Council reconfirmed the commitment to maintain the exit date for ATMIS of 31 December 2024.⁸⁷ The Council requested the Secretary-General to provide the report initially requested under paragraph 51 of resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#) by 15 February 2023, by 30 April 2023 instead, and decided to convene a formal meeting on the transition in Somalia no later than 31 March 2023.⁸⁸

Operation Althea of the European Union Force in Bosnia and Herzegovina

By resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#) of 2 November, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council renewed its authorization of EUFOR-Althea for a period of 12 months.⁸⁹ The Council reiterated its authorization to Member States to take all necessary measures to effect the implementation of and to ensure compliance with annexes 1-A and 2 of the General Framework Agreement for Peace in Bosnia and Herzegovina, and stressed that the parties would be held equally responsible for compliance with those annexes and would be subject to such enforcement action by EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence as might be necessary.⁹⁰ The Council also authorized Member States to take all necessary measures, at the request of either

⁸³ *Ibid.*, para. 35.

⁸⁴ Resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), para. 1 (a).

⁸⁵ See [S/2022/939](#).

⁸⁶ Resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), second preambular paragraph.

⁸⁷ *Ibid.*, para. 1(b).

⁸⁸ Resolution [2670 \(2022\)](#), paras. 1 (c) and 3.

⁸⁹ Resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#), para. 1. For information on the establishment of EUFOR-Althea, see *Repertoire, Supplement 2004-2007*, chap. XII, part III.C.

⁹⁰ Resolution [2658 \(2022\)](#), para. 3.

EUFOR-Althea or NATO Headquarters, in defence of EUFOR-Althea or the NATO presence, respectively, and to assist both organizations in carrying out their missions. In addition, the Council recognized the right of EUFOR-Althea and the NATO presence to take all necessary measures to defend themselves from attack or threat of attack.⁹¹

(ii) **Other peacekeeping** ~~og .4.6 (u)10.r0 (plc4 (es)p0.88Tc 0.0 m)4f gr0 u1Iese oe o~~

developing its own capacity to support itself, while taking note that the European

Union decided to suspend temporarily and reversibly some of its funding^{4.1 (er1 (f)3 (8xi)-2 (n4 (ve)4 (1}

Mission in Somalia (ATMIS) and the transition of its security responsibilities to the Somali national authorities (see case 8).

Case 7

Peace and security in Africa

At a meeting held on 18 May under the item entitled “Peace and security in Africa”, the Council discussed the mandate and operations of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel and its cooperation with the United Nations Multidimensional Integrated Stabilization Mission in Mali (MINUSMA) further to the report of the Secretary-General.¹¹¹ The Council was briefed by the Assistant Secretary-General for Africa in the Departments of Political and Peacebuilding Affairs and Peace Operations, the he Uniteitical and Peaccucal anee

the United Nations to support the Joint Force because their countries were fighting against terrorism, not only in their own interests, but also in the interest of international peace and security. He also noted that the three African members of the Council had always advocated for a positive stance towards the Joint Force that would allow it to meet the challenges, as the support provided by MINUSMA remained below the expectations. Nevertheless, the Executive Secretary added that, since the end of 2019, the Joint Force was able to carry out numerous operations and put in place a compliance framework to ensure respect for international human rights law and international humanitarian law.

In the discussion that followed the briefings, Council members underscored the importance of the Joint Force of the Group of Five for the Sahel as a regional effort to address the threat of terrorism. The representative of Ghana, who also spoke on behalf of Gabon and Kenya, stated that the continuous support for regionally-led and complementary initiatives, including through bilateral and multilateral support for

Somali security forces under the Somalia Transition Plan depended on the provision of adequate, sustainable and predictable funding for the Mission.¹¹⁵ The representative Gabon, who also spoke on behalf of Ghana and Kenya, and the representative of the United Arab Emirates stated that a careful and effective transition from ATMIS to the Somali security forces was required to prevent the creation of a security vacuum which would enable Al-Shabaab to expand its operations. By contrast, the representative France stated that no new funding, regardless of the amount, would suffice without Somali efforts to generate armed forces or without strong support from ATMIS to help Somali forces and conduct offensive operations with them. He added that France therefore encouraged the Government and ATMIS to resolutely commit to the security transition in order to achieve the objectives as outlined in resolution [2628 \(2022\)](#).

¹¹⁵ China, Gabon (also on behalf of Ghana and Kenya), Russian Federation

IV. Authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

Note

Section IV concerns the practice of the Council in utilizing regional and subregional arrangements for enforcement action under its authority, as provided for in Article 53 of the Charter. The present section focuses on the authorization of enforcement action by regional and other organizations, with the exception of authorizations to use force for regional peacekeeping operations, which are covered in section III above. Cooperation with regional arrangements in the implementation of measures adopted by the Council under Chapter VII not involving the use of force is also covered in the present section. The section is divided into two subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements and subsection B covers discussions concerning the authorization of enforcement action and the implementation of other Chapter VII measures by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the authorization of enforcement action by regional arrangements

In 2022, the Council did not explicitly refer to Article 53 of the Charter in its decisions. It did, however, authorize the use of force by regional arrangements beyond the context of regional peacekeeping operations.

Concerning the situation in Libya, in resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council extended the authorizations as set out in resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#) for Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, to inspect vessels they had reasonable grounds to believe were carrying arms or related materiel to or from Libya in order to ensure implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya, and to use all measures commensurate to the specific circumstances to carry out such inspections.¹¹⁶ By resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), acting under Chapter VII, the Council renewed the authorizations to Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations, set out in paragraphs 7 to 10 of resolution [2240 \(2015\)](#), to inspect on the high seas off the coast of Libya vessels believed to be used for migrant smuggling and human

¹¹⁶ Resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), para. 1.

by which the Council, acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, referred the situation in Darfur to the Court.¹¹⁸ At the meeting held on 17 January,¹¹⁹ the representative of Kenya recalled that, in resolution [1593 \(2005\)](#), the Council invited the International Criminal Court and the African Union to discuss practical arrangements to facilitate the Court's work, including the possibility of conducting proceedings in the region. Further to the statement of the representative of Kenya, the Prosecutor highlighted his engagement with the African Union and underscored that the Darfur case had to be properly investigated and put before an appropriate tribunal, whether it be the International Criminal Court, a tribunal in the Sudan or a hybrid option, including with support from the African Union. Similarly, at the second meeting held on 23 August,¹²⁰ the representative of Ghana noted the steps taken by the Court to increase avenues of accountability through cooperation with third States and international and regional organizations, adding that increased cooperation with the African Union could help address the lack of cooperation between the Court and the Sudan.

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by which it extended the authorizations for Member States, acting nationally or through regional organizations to inspect vessels in support of the arms embargo off the coast of Libya.¹²⁴ Following the adoption of the resolution, having abstained in the vote, the representative of the Russian Federation expressed regret that Operation IRINI had over recent years demonstrated very low levels of effectiveness in assisting the implementation of the provisions of the Libyan arms embargo.¹²⁵ In that regard, the representative pointed to a lack of successful seizures of contraband goods, lack of transparency and a selective approach to vessels flying flags of particular States. He further stated that, for the upcoming year, the Russian Federation would continue to closely monitor the work of Operation IRINI to ensure full compliance with the arms embargo, particularly whether it was effective in combatting flows of illegal weapons and whether it was in line with the mandate stipulated in resolution [2292 \(2016\)](#).

Subsequently, at a meeting held on 25 July under the same item, the representative of Mexico expressed concern with reports of possible shipments of military equipment to Libya in contravention of Council resolutions.¹²⁶ He called on all States to cooperate with Operation IRINI in order to prevent weapons from continuing to fuel violence in the country. He further recalled that the auth(c)4 ((ut)-2 (h22z4 (l)-2 (13 (I

Head of the African Union Mission in Somalia, and the Head of the Delegation of the European Union to the United Nations. The representative of the European Union held the view that Operation Atalanta had successfully contributed to the suppression of piracy off the coast of Somalia. While noting the readiness of the European Union to work with the Somali authorities to support their efforts on maritime security, the representative expressed hope that the Council would be able to agree on a revised resolution that better reflected Somali priorities, while also renewing the legal provisions necessary for the continuation of Operation Atalanta for at least the remainder of the year. He further cautioned that, if the resolution was not extended beyond 3 March 2022, Operation Atalanta would not have the authorization to fight piracy or to protect the deliveries of the World Food Programme and other vulnerable vessels in the Somali territorial waters.¹³⁰

During the discussion, the representative of the United Kingdom noted that her delegation had no objection in principle to the desire of the Federal Government of

order to allow South Sudan to build the security capacity necessary to maintain national security and stability. He further recommended that the Council adopt measures to gradually ease the sanctions regime which would help South Sudan respond positively to the concerns of the African Union.

At a meeting held on 29 July under the item entitled “The situation in the Central African Republic”,¹³³ acting under Chapter VII of the Charter, the Council adopted resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#). As a result, the Council extended the sanctions measures on the Central African Republic.¹³⁴ Speaking after the vote, the representative of Kenya explained that his delegation abstained in the voting because resolution [2648 \(2022\)](#)

V. Reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security

Note

Section V examines the reporting by regional arrangements on their activities in the maintenance of international peace and security within the framework of Article 54 of the Charter. The section is divided into three subsections. Subsection A covers decisions concerning reporting by regional arrangements, subsection B covers discussions concerning reporting by regional arrangements, and subsection C covers communications concerning reporting by regional arrangements.

A. Decisions concerning the reporting by regional arrangements

During the period under review, the Council made no explicit reference to Article 54 of the Charter in its decisions. The Council did, however, request reporting from regional organizations on peacekeeping operations led by them, either directly or through the Secretary-General, as well as on maritime enforcement actions undertaken further to relevant resolutions of the Council, as described in further detail and summarized in table 3.

Concerning Libya, in resolution [2635 \(2022\)](#), the Council requested the Secretary-General to report in six and 11 months on the implementation of the authorizations set out in resolution [2578 \(2021\)](#) for Member States acting nationally or through regional organizations concerning the implementation of the arms embargo on the high seas off the coast of Libya.¹³⁵ In addition, in resolution [2652 \(2022\)](#), the Council renewed the reporting requests set out in paragraph 17 of resolution [2240 \(2016\)](#).

