

SECURITY COUNCIL COMMITTEE PURSUANT
TO RESOLUTIONS 1267 (1999) AND 1989 (2011)
CONCERNING AL-QAIDA AND ASSOCIATED
INDIVIDUALS AND ENTITIES

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**Briefing to the Security Council
19 November 2014**

I. Introduction

1. When I last briefed the Council as Chair of the Al Qaida Committee in May I spoke about the threat arising from an increasing range of heterogeneous Al-Qaida linked or splinter groups. Since May we have all witnessed the dramatic shift in this threat, with the brutal extremism and rapid territorial gains of two groups on the Al Qaida Sanctions List: the Islamic State in Iraq and the Levant (ISIL) and the Al-Nusrah Front (ANF).

live in areas under their control, and raising revenue through the sale of stolen goods. There is evidence ISIL encourages looting and smuggling of antiquities from Iraq and Syria and generates revenue by taxing looters. ANF, however, lacks the same range and depth of resources and appears to rely more on external donations and kidnap for ransom. The funds generated from these illegal activities are used by groups to support their recruitment efforts and strengthen their operational capability to organise and carry out terrorist attacks.

9. In terms of ISIL and ANF's recruits, the Team identified three main sources: foreign terrorist fighters; local Iraqis and Syrians; and new local affiliates, ranging from militia and ex-Baathists who have made tactical alliances with ISIL. Recruits are drawn in through internet-based platforms, personal contact and persuasion, or in some cases through prison-based networks. Despite the sharp growth in foreign terrorist fighters in the last three years, the Monitoring Team found no specific typology for a foreign terrorist fighter: but more data was emerging. What can be said is that this new wave tends to be younger, more diverse and digital-savvy, which in turn generates fresh social and operational networks that are more transnational. Fighters came from over 80 countries, with large groupings from the Maghreb and Middle East, along with Europe and Central Asia. There was also evidence of a significant presence of dual nationals with European passports.

III. Enhancing the effectiveness of the Al-Qaida Sanctions regime in targeting this threat and possibilities for future action

10. As directed in resolution 2170 (2014), the Monitoring Team has made a number of detailed recommendations which the Committee is now considering.

11. The Monitoring Team recommends that the Committee promote fuller implementation and greater use of the Al Qaida Sanctions Regime, by encouraging States to identify more designations to the Committee relevant to ISIL and ANF and encouraging the availability of technical assistance and capacity building to address gaps in implementation in collaboration with the Counter-Terrorism Committee and its Executive Directorate.

12. The Monitoring Team also recommends a number of measures requiring Council action, designed to stem the flow of funds to ISIL and ANF from the sale of oil from territory they control, but also to tackle potential revenue streams, such as from looted antiquities, and to prevent possible avenues for resupply in ISIL and ANF controlled territory, by banning flights to or from such territory. The Team also recommends a specific focus on heightened vigilance in the banking sector against ISIL and ANF. Should such measures be adopted, the Team also recommends the Committee assess the impact of such measures after 6 months to ensure they affect only their target.

13. Lastly, the Monitoring Team recommends Member States use INTERPOL's network and tools, such as the Transnational Fighters database, to share information on known and suspected foreign terrorist fighters, and highlights the need for more

14. Effectively-implemented, well-targeted Al-Qaida sanctions can make a meaningful contribution to disrupting ISIL and ANF and inhibiting their international network of recruits and facilitators. But sanctions alone are not sufficient: a comprehensive approach is needed, that properly integrates UN strategies with multilateral and national action and incorporates strategic communication to counter the terrorist narrative.