The UN DPRK sanctions regime and the Panel's 2021 Midterm Report (S/2021/777)

Coordinator UN DPRK Panel of Experts New York, 19 October 2021

Who are we?

- 8 experts on DPRK and sanctions implementation, each employed the UN as an independent authority with a specific portfolio.
- Those portfolios are: finance/economics; missiles and other technologies; conventional arms and other WMD; pooliferation, procurement and trade; nonoliferation and regional security; nuclear issues; customs and export controls; maritime issues.
- One expert is appointed as a coordinator
- We areappointed on an annual basisbut our contracts can be renewed for up to five years.

What do we do?

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/panel_experts/work mandate

- To provide assistance to the 1718 Committee carrying out its mandate and functions;
- To investigate we gather, examine and analyze information from States, relevant UN bodies and other interested parties, in particula incidents of noreompliance with the UN sanctions regime;
- To report: to write midterm and final reports, based on our investigations, in August and February each year; and
- To make recommendations our reports include recommendations or actions the Council, Committee or Member States may consider to improve implementation of the sanctions regime. This includes recommendations to designate individuals or entities.

- There are teDPRK sanctions resolutions, all of them unanimously agreed by the Security Council. All of them on the Committee's website.
- This adds up to a complex and comprehensive series of sanctions measures.
- Detail best understood through the resolutions themselves, and the Committee's Implementation Assistance notices at:

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718/implementation notices The DPRK sanctions regime comprises:

- an arms and related materiel embargo;
- a nuclear, ballistic missiles and other WMD programmes-related embargo;
- Sectoral sanctions, banning the export/import of coal, minerals, fuel, food and agricultural products, earth, stone, wood, industrial machinery, transportation vehicles, seafood, fishing licenses in DPRK waters, textiles and luxury goods;
- bans, limits and places restrictions on the DPRK's access to energy sources such as crude oil and refined petroleum products;
- financial sanctions, including a ban on the provision of financial services that could contribute to prohibited programmes or the evasion of sanctions, and the opening of DPRK banking subsidiaries;

- interdiction, inspection and transportation -related measures;
- a travel ban and/or assets freeze on designated individuals and entities;
- a ban on specialized teaching and training and the suspension of scientific and technical cooperation;
- a ban on providing we2f/3 (r)-7.3k(i)-1.3 [(a)-6.7u(d)-2.3(t)-5.7 (h)-3.7 (o)1.
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Ballistic missile and other WMD programmes

- 25 March: modified and enlarged KN23 SRBM
- Solid propellant, launched from 5axle TEL.
- Combines ballistic and guidance technologies
- Claimed warhead size of 2.5tonnes. Range 600km

- Panel identified 11 papers in composite structures and vibration analysis jointly published by DPRK scientists and academics at a number of Chinese universities in 2019.
- These fields of study have other industrial applications, but are essential in nuclear and BM programmes


- DPRK imported substantially less oil and oil products to date in 2021 than in previous years.
- Direct deliveries by foreign tankers to DPRK not reported. Transfers of oil products between ships continued in a number of areas, particularly at night, but at a reduced level.
- Elaborate deception practices by shipping companies and their vessels continued.
- DPRK continued to enlarge its fleet through acquisition of former foreign -flagged vessels.

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Finance and cyler

- DPRK's links to global financial institutions are undiminished, and remain essential to maritime sanctions evasion, trade, and illicit labour.
- Panel's investigation identified Winson as a key node in DPRK's illicit procurement of fuel. Significant and complex network of shell companies and concealed beneficial ownership.
- DPRK's continuing cyber programme, targeting defence industries and pharma companies around the globe.


- DPRK's recorded foreign trade plummeted, and the import of luxury goods fell dramatically.
- IT workers, banking representatives and other workers continue to work overseas. The COVID19 blockade means that repatriation of such workers, long after the December 2019 deadline, is not possible.



- Humanitarian situation in DPRK declining, and the "food crisis" has become the DPRK government's principal focus.
- COVID-19 border closure and the almost complete cessation of consumer imports are major contributors to humanitarian situation.
- UN sanctions are likely to continue to have unintended effects on the humanitarian situation, although COVID -19 blockade means that their relative impact has probably decreased.



- This report contains no recommendations for new designations of individuals, entities or vessels.
- 21 recommendations to the Security Council, 1718 Committee, Member States and maritime flag registries on maritime, import/export trade control lists, luxury goods, finance and unintended impact of sanctions.



For more information:

Visit the webpage of the 1718 Committee

https://www.un.org/securitycouncil/sanctions/1718

Contact the Panel of Experts

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