

**General Assembly**  
Sixty-sixth session

**First Committee**

**11**th meeting

Thursday, 13 October 2011, 3 p.m.  
New York

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Newly Confirmed of the NPT Treaty on the

The Treaty's full implementation will strengthen

In the wake of the Treaty's entry into force we have

Another key issue that in our view requires

*Ejckt:* Mr. Viinanen

**Mr. Vasiliev** (Russian Federation) (

We welcome the decisions of the 2010 NPT

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*Twuukcp*): Once again, Mr. Chair, I welcome you to your new post.

We have already had an opportunity, in the general debate, to discuss the Russian approach to the nuclear

The Russian Federation is satisfied with the way in which the NPT has been implemented.

We will present more details about the Treaty during the Russian Federation's contribution to the debate.

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interaction between Russia and the United States and NATO on missile defence. If events develop further in



In the field of nuclear non-proliferation, coherent multilateral efforts are needed to promote and strengthen



remain committed to ridding the world of this scourge. A global norm or an agreed objective for their total elimination already exists.

The Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) itself and the outcomes of its 2000 and 2010 Review Conferences, taken together, make it unequivocally clear that there exists the common objective of creating a world without nuclear weapons. The task before us, then, is to implement it, and to do so with a stronger sense of urgency. The Philippines urges the nuclear-weapon States to now convert into deeds their commitments, including those in actions 3, 5 and 21 of the “Conclusions and recommendations for follow-on actions” of the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

Action 3 says that “the nuclear-weapon States commit to undertake further efforts to reduce and ultimately eliminate all types of nuclear weapons”

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terrorists and other non-State actors to devastating and horrific effect. There must be serious discussions about this type of weapon during the next NPT review cycle.

We urge the few countries that have remained outside the NPT to heed the call for the universal application of the Treaty.

States must now also seriously consider negotiating a nuclear weapons convention, whether in the Conference on Disarmament or elsewhere. Such a convention is included in the Secretary-General’s five-point proposal and is referred to in the Final Document of the 2010 NPT Review Conference.

The Philippines strongly supports the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty, and would like to see it enter into force as soon as possible. We urge the remaining nine annex 2 States to ratify the Treaty. The Philippines also enjoins non-annex 2 States that have yet to ratify the Treaty to do so. The Philippines welcomes the intention of Indonesia and the United States to ratify the Treaty, and hopes they will do so at the soonest possible time. Furthermore, the Philippines welcomes the positive outcome of the recently concluded article XIV Conference.

The Philippines sees the negotiation of a treaty banning the production of fissile materials for nuclear weapons and other nuclear explosive devices as a key component of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation, and an essential step. It is hoped that negotiations on it can begin in the Conference on Disarmament, but if that body remains ineffectual the Philippines agrees with those States that have called for alternative means and venues to be found.

The Philippines stresses the importance, as a contribution to nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation, of nuclear-weapon-free zones, and hopes that the nuclear-weapon States will adhere to and accede to the respective protocols of the zones, especially that of the Bangkok Treaty. In this regard, the Philippines commends the nuclear-weapon States for their positive interaction with the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) in direct consultations last August and this October. My delegation hopes that Member States will support our draft resolution on the Bangkok Treaty.

The emergence and development of nuclear-weapon-free zones and the negative security assurances that they offer are tangible and effective opportunities to advance the global disarmament

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and non-proliferation agenda. ASEAN is advancing the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone with the nuclear-weapon-free States, and is also initiating cooperation with other nuclear-weapon-free zones, such as the Tlatelolco Treaty regime through the Agency for the Prohibition of Nuclear Weapons in Latin America and the Caribbean.

The Philippines puts a premium on the establishment of a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East, and emphasizes the importance of having a successful conference in 2012. To that end, the Philippines urges the sponsors of the 1995 Middle East resolution and the Secretary-General to undertake as soon as possible the necessary actions, such as appointing a facilitator acceptable to all States in the region, and to designate a host Government for the 2012 conference.

The 64-point action plan of the 2010 NPT Review Conference expresses deep concern over the catastrophic humanitarian consequences of any use of nuclear weapons, and reaffirms the need for all States at all times to comply with applicable international law, including international humanitarian law.

In our statement in the plenary general debate last month, we emphasized the importance of a rules-based system in the conduct of international relations. This rules-based approach should also apply to the issue of nuclear weapons. The Philippines continues to strongly believe that the threat or use of nuclear weapons violate international humanitarian law.

**Mr. Kwon Hae-ryong** (Republic of Korea): Nuclear disarmament is crucial in reducing the threat of nuclear war and ensuring that such unthinkable power is never again used for destructive purposes against mankind. In that light, there have been many initiatives seeking to make progress in the field of nuclear disarmament. A key example is the Secretary-General's efforts to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world through his 2009 five-point proposal.

In the past few years, the world has seen significant progress in the disarmament and non-proliferation arena. Last year, the Nuclear Security Summit was held in Washington, D.C. A month later, at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Final Document (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)) was successfully adopted by consensus for the first time in a decade. The New START treaty between the two major nuclear-weapon States entered into force in February.

However, given that there is still a wide gap in perception between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon States, it would be hard to assert that nuclear disarmament has been as successful as we had hoped. To narrow this perception gap, we believe, nuclear-weapon States must demonstrate a higher standard of compliance through sustainable nuclear disarmament measures. We firmly believe that deeper voluntary cuts by nuclear-weapon States will grant them greater moral authority and political legitimacy to call on non-nuclear-weapon States to join them in strengthening the non-proliferation regime.

My delegation also strongly believes that in order to rekindle global efforts for nuclear disarmament it is of the utmost importance to restore trust and nurture a spirit of cooperation between nuclear-weapon States and non-nuclear-weapon states.

The Republic of Korea welcomes the results of the eighth NPT Review Conference and affirms that the NPT should continue to function as a cornerstone of global peace and security. Its three pillars — nuclear disarmament, nuclear non-proliferation, and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy — should be bolstered in a mutually reinforcing manner. It is especially important to faithfully implement the 64-point conclusions and recommendations in the Final Document, which condensed the goals and wishes of all countries to realize a world free of nuclear weapons.

In our common effort to prevent the vertical and horizontal proliferation of nuclear weapons, and finally to realize a nuclear-weapon-free world, it is imperative that we ensure the early entry into force of the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT). We call upon those States that have not yet ratified it, in particular the remaining annex 2 States, to do so immediately. We also stress the importance of maintaining a moratorium on nuclear testing until the entry into force of the CTBT.

In addition, a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) is indispensable, not only for nuclear non-proliferation, but also for nuclear disarmament. We believe that the time is ripe for the commencement of negotiations on an FMCT in the Conference on Disarmament. My delegation calls upon all Conference members to show more flexibility and political will so that negotiations can begin at the earliest possible date.

Any meaningful progress in the pace of negotiations for the conclusion of an FMCT will serve

The Republic of Korea also shares the concerns of the international community about the outstanding questions regarding the nuclear programmes of Iran and Syria. Iran's continued enrichment activities and lack of cooperation with the IAEA are sources of profound concern. Syria still refuses to allow the IAEA access to its entire nuclear activities and sites. We urge Iran and Syria to cooperate fully with the IAEA to resolve all outstanding questions about their nuclear programmes.

In order to achieve the goal of nuclear disarmament, we must all reflect upon the evolution of the international environment and find a practical path towards a world free of nuclear weapons. What we need at this moment is the wise and balanced combination of being ambitious but realistic.

**Mr. Zhang Jun'an** (China) (*urqmg" kp" Ejkgug*): The complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and establishing a world free of nuclear weapons are the common aspirations of all peace-loving people in the world. We are glad that such a proposition has won increasing support of nuclear weapons areItNBsRkÁqnš&jLQn( me)-3(u)-1(n)6(t)20(e) envirmament,



Conference (NPT/CONF.2010/50 (Vol. I)), champion a new thinking on security featuring mutual trust, mutual benefit, equality and coordination, and work to pursue comprehensive security, common security and cooperative security, with a view to creating an international environment featuring mutual benefit and common security, and fostering favourable conditions for making progress in nuclear disarmament.

We should focus on the lofty goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and adopt a two-pronged approach of both promoting the nuclear disarmament process and reducing nuclear weapon threats, to consolidate and enhance the hard-won momentum of nuclear disarmament. To this end, China would like to reaffirm the following points.

First, all nuclear-weapon States should fulfil in good faith obligations under article VI of the NPT, and publicly undertake not to seek permanent possession of nuclear weapons. Countries with the largest nuclear arsenals should continue to take the lead in making drastic and substantive reductions in their nuclear weapons in a verifiable and irreversible manner.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty should be brought into force at an early date.

The Conference on Disarmament is the sole appropriate forum for negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty. Negotiations on such a treaty, with the participation of all relevant parties, should commence at the Conference as soon as possible.

When conditions are mature, other nuclear-weapon States should also join the multilateral negotiations on nuclear disarmament. To attain the ultimate goal of complete and thorough nuclear disarmament, the international community should develop, at an appropriate time, a viable, long-term plan composed of phased actions, including the conclusion of a convention on the complete prohibition of nuclear weapons.

Secondly, all nuclear-weapon States should abandon the nuclear deterrence policy based on first use of nuclear weapons and take credible steps to reduce the threat of nuclear weapons. All nuclear-weapon States should unequivocally undertake no-first-use of nuclear weapons and negotiate and conclude a treaty on no-first-use of nuclear weapons against one another. Nuclear-weapon States should also unequivocally undertake not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States or nuclear-weapon-free zones, and conclude a

legally-binding international instrument in this regard at an early date.

Thirdly, nuclear disarmament must follow the principles of promoting international stability, peace and security and undiminished and increased security for all. The development of missile defence systems that disrupt global strategic stability should be abandoned. The multilateral negotiation process to prevent the weaponization of outer space and an arms race in outer space should be vigorously promoted.

Fourthly, the international community should extend strong support to efforts made by countries of relevant regions in establishing nuclear-weapon-free zones. We hope that all parties will make joint efforts and actively participate in the preparatory process, to achieve positive outcomes from the 2012 international conference on the establishment of a Middle East zone free of nuclear weapons and all other weapons of mass destruction.

China has consistently stood for the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons, and is firmly committed to a nuclear strategy of self-defence. China has adhered to the policy of no-first-use of nuclear weapons at any time or under any circumstances, and has made the unequivocal and unconditional commitment not to use or threaten to use nuclear weapons against non-nuclear-weapon States and nuclear-weapon-free zones. This open, unequivocal and transparent nuclear policy makes China unique among all nuclear-weapon States.

China has never deployed any nuclear weapons on foreign territory. China has never participated in any form of nuclear arms race, nor will it ever do so. China will continue to keep its nuclear capabilities at the minimum level required for national security.

China is willing to work with the international community to continuously make unremitting efforts in promoting the international nuclear disarmament process so as to ultimately realize the goal of the complete prohibition and thorough destruction of nuclear weapons and to establish a world free of nuclear weapons.

**Mr. Tarar** (Pakistan): The nuclear era following the Second World War witnessed a race for strategic nuclear superiority. During the Cold War, the major nuclear Powers continued their production and modernization of nuclear weapons despite knowing their catastrophic implications for humanity. Parallel to this, development

on the principle of equal security of States, SSOD-I consensually agreed to sanctify the principle of consensus for multilateral disarmament negotiations. Several treaties have been negotiated on the basis of this principle.

However, recently we have heard arguments from some powerful States that this consensus is no longer valid. At the same time, they oppose the convening of a fourth special session devoted to disarmament to build a new consensus on global disarmament. The only possible explanation for such a paradoxical approach is that these States are not willing to abide by their commitment to renounce nuclear weapons.

The Charter obliges nations not to use or threaten to use force. Therefore, the intention to use nuclear weapons or the threat of their use is not only illegal but also morally indefensible. The demand for negative security assurances by the non-nuclear-weapon States is based on their desire to remove the ever-existent threat of a possible use of nuclear weapons against them. Denying them these assurances could only mean that the nuclear-weapon States want to preserve their option to use nuclear weapons even against non-nuclear-weapon States. In such a scenario, how could the global environment be conducive to disarmament efforts when the nuclear-weapon States intend to preserve not only their nuclear arsenals but also the option to use them?

Some of those major States have now resorted to shifting the focus of the international community towards a much more limited goal of nuclear non-proliferation, albeit with a selective and discriminatory approach. This would not only preserve their eminent nuclear status in the global security architecture, but would also enable them to claim a sham progress in disarmament.

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With that logic, for example, the contentious elements pertaining to the issue of nuclear disarmament should not have prevented commencement of negotiations on this single most important agenda item for 32 years. However, if those States have legitimate security concerns they should openly state their reasons for opposing commencement of negotiations on the other three equally important, if not more important, issues on the Conference's agenda. The fact that they have chosen not to do so raises serious questions about their motives and their commitment to nuclear disarmament, and indeed to the work of the Conference on Disarmament itself.

**Mr. Camacho** (Mexico) (*urqmg"kp"Urcpkuj*): First, my country fully endorses the statement made by New Zealand on behalf of the countries of the New Agenda Coalition.

According to available data, there are currently more than 20,500 nuclear weapons in the world. Of these, about 5,000 are deployed and ready to be used, including some 2,000 kept in a state of high operational readiness. No one can feel safe in the face of such numbers, which are also an endless source of suspicion and apprehension. Those figures are absurd in view of the relation of forces since the Cold War. At a time of deep economic, financial, energy and food crisis, and other huge challenge-19(n)16e c31(w o)2huudidid War. Ase Nnee ot1(c)16(l)a t,-4d5neol(e a)4(sw T)7(i)-4(s)-7(, J TJ0.28(r)1)-1(n o n16li2n(s)0-9(a)

The unequivocal commitment to disarmament by the nuclear-weapon States is an essential part of the negotiating package of the NPT, which we regard as the cornerstone of the disarmament and non-proliferation regime. More than 40 years after the Treaty's entry into force, the obligation set forth in article VI and addressed again in the advisory opinion of the International Court of Justice in 1996 — to pursue negotiations in good faith relating to cessation of the nuclear arms race — has not been met.

In the past 15 years, those negotiations should have taken place in the forum with the mandate for them. However, the Conference on Disarmament remains at a standstill, the victim of its own rules of procedure, thus unable to reach the destination that the international community has assigned to it.

We strongly believe that the quest for a world free of nuclear weapons should not be made subject to the impasse in the Conference on Disarmament. We must move from words to deeds and find alternatives for action. We invite Members of the United Nations to be flexible and open in reflecting on what interests we benefit when we privilege structure and mechanisms over substance.

While we permit the impasse, nuclear weapons continue to exist, and we encourage their proliferation. More countries possess these weapons, and the nuclear-weapon States continue to make technical improvements to existing weapons. Until we make concrete progress, we shall lack incentives for nuclear-weapon States to get rid of such weapons.

**Ms. González Román** (Spain) (*urqmg"kp"Urcpkuj*): I have the honour to take the floor to offer several thoughts on the events of recent months in the area of nuclear disarmament and non-proliferation.

We have seen positive elements, but we have also seen an impasse in certain areas. While momentum came with the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) and the entry into force of the New START treaty between the United States and the Russian Federation, there are other factors to set against those positive elements. They include the ongoing standstill at the Conference on Disarmament; that negotiating forum cannot move forward on a programme of work

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Finland warmly welcomes continued global arms control and nuclear disarmament efforts. In the past 18 months we have seen a series of positive events, including the successful outcome of the Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the signing and entry into force of the New START treaty, which is a major achievement, and the Washington Nuclear Security Summit.

For Finland, the NPT remains the cornerstone of the global nuclear non-proliferation and disarmament regime. Finland is fully committed to work to strengthen

It is time to close the door on nuclear-weapon tests. The entry into force of the CTBT will considerably strengthen the world's security architecture. The provisional verification regime embedded in the Treaty has already proved to be very useful, as was seen in the aftermath of the Fukushima accident, when the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty Organization provided crucial assistance through its monitoring stations. Now it is time to act: Finland calls upon all States that have not yet signed and ratified the CTBT to do so without further delay.

**Mrs. Ledesma Hernández** (Cuba) (*urqmg" kp" Urcpkuj*): International peace and security continue to be threatened by the existence of more than 22,000 nuclear warheads, half of them ready for immediate use. The employment of just a tiny part of this arsenal would bring nuclear winter, and with it the destruction of all life on Earth. It is unacceptable that certain nuclear-weapon States are not renouncing such weapons as part of their security doctrines based on nuclear deterrence. Even worse, they spend billions of dollars to develop and update their nuclear arsenals.

Cuba believes that the use of nuclear weapons is illegal, completely immoral and unjustifiable in any circumstance or under any security doctrine. Their use would be a flagrant violation of international norms with regard to preventing genocide.

The only guarantee that nuclear weapons will not be used by States or anyone else is their elimination and total prohibition under strict international control, which should also apply to conventional weapons of a similar lethality. Nuclear disarmament is, and should continue to be, the highest disarmament priority, as leaders of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) have said repeatedly and at the highest level, and as was established at the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

The eighth Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) made it very clear that the rhetoric and good intentions of some of the nuclear-weapon States are far removed from the commitment and concrete steps that they are willing to make. We urge them to ensure that the modest measures in the action plan adopted at that Review Conference are fully implemented.

Further, the entry into force of the agreement between the main nuclear Powers to reduce their strategic offensive nuclear arsenals is a positive sign.

under discussion today — nuclear weapons and their elimination in the context of the international non-proliferation regime.

As a non-nuclear-weapon State party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), the Czech Republic supports the implementation of all articles of the Treaty, including that relating to nuclear disarmament. However, we are of the view that the long-standing objective of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons may be achieved only if all demands to strengthen the non-proliferation regime are met. We stress the key role played by the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) in this regard, and we support all activities aimed at elevating the international verification standard to the highest level.

I reiterate that the universal adoption and implementation of the IAEA comprehensive safeguards agreements and additional protocols remains essential for our further endeavours in the field of nuclear non-proliferation. Based on our experience, we are convinced that those two instruments are the most important tools of the IAEA for detecting and deterring the diversion of nuclear materials.

We agree with the conclusions and recommendations of the action plan approved at the most recent Review Conference of the Parties to the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty, which includes a set of concrete recommendations with regard to the total elimination of nuclear weapons. Nevertheless, we are of the view that at present the international community is far from setting a concrete deadline for reaching that objective. We are aware that there are still many questions, both political and technical, that need to be addressed and resolved to this end.







countries to use their full name or the name usually used within the United Nations context. The rules on this issue are that when speaking of other countries one should use the official name, or an abbreviation.

**Ms. Anderson** (Canada) (*urqmg" kp" Htgpej*): Multilateral disarmament negotiations must not indefinitely remain hostage to procedural tactics and abuse of the consensus rule in the Conference on Disarmament. If the Conference remains unable to fulfil its mandate, other processes should be considered in an effort to fill that vacuum.

**Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): My statement is rather long. I shall omit some paragraphs, and the whole statement will be distributed.

The continued existence of thousands of deployed and undeployed strategic and non-strategic nuclear weapons around the world continues to seriously threaten international peace and security and the very survival of human civilization.

While there is no pretext to justify the possession of nuclear weapons by any country, it is a source of grave concern that certain nuclear-weapon States continue to allocate billions of dollars to develop new types of nuclear weapons. These new nuclear weapon production facilities modernize and replace such weapons. Equally, those countries, in contravention of their obligations under article VI of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT), continue

kinds of missile technology and materials to promote its capacity to deliver weapons of mass destruction. According to international experts, the Zionist regime's Jericho 1 ballistic missile is based on the French missile MD 600. It is ironic that France cried wolf in this Committee about the proliferation of missiles in the region.

The Islamic Republic of Iran continues to fully support the position of the Non-Aligned Movement on the need for negotiations on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeline, including the start of negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament, based on a balanced and comprehensive programme of work, for the conclusion of a nuclear-weapon instrument. Such negotiations must lead to legally prohibiting, once and for all, the possession, development, stockpiling and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any country, and provide for the total destruction of such inhumane weapons by 2025, as well as a universal and unconditional legally binding instrument on negative security assurances as an intermediate step.

In our view, any attempt to undermine the Conference on Disarmament by hijacking its established mandate or pushing it towards a one-sided programme of work is doomed to fail. In this context, the recent proposal for negotiations on one of the four core issues outside the Conference on Disarmament is in clear contravention of the agreements reached at the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT.

The international community has noted the New START, but as this Treaty does not go beyond mere decommissioning of nuclear weapons and lacks any international verification mechanism, and as its parties did not commit themselves to destroying their nuclear weapons, it can never be a substitute for the explicit legal obligations of nuclear-weapon States to completely



Notwithstanding this decision, Germany remains a committed international partner in all matters concerning the peaceful uses of nuclear energy, and in particular in ensuring the highest possible safety and security standards. We fully respect the right of each nation to use nuclear energy for peaceful purposes.

However, the consequences of nuclear accidents do

view of the persistent inability of the Conference on Disarmament to start FMCT negotiations and substantive discussions on its other three core issues, we stand ready to consider new ways to turn the Conference once again into a functioning institution, in particular with a view to beginning FMCT negotiations. In that respect, we express in particular our support for the forward-oriented approach taken by the delegation of Canada in its draft resolution on the FMCT.

The Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) constitutes an irreplaceable pillar of the global disarmament architecture. Fifteen years since its opening for signing, the CTBT has received nearly worldwide support. Its early entry into force would be a core element of advancing nuclear disarmament, and it

political bad faith and will, and an attempt to distort facts and mislead everyone.

Unfortunately, the representative of the Republic of Korea compels me to recall that his country does not respect and is not committed to the implementation of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). His country lives in the shadow of a nuclear State, and authorizes the presence of nuclear weapons on its territory, in flagrant violation of the provisions of the NPT. This represents lack of respect for the provisions of the Treaty by his country. We also wonder about the clandestine nuclear programmes developed by the Republic of Korea. We have a great deal of alarming information about Korea's lack of respect for the NPT and other treaties and conventions. Therefore, we urge the representative of the Republic of Korea not to compel us to disclose this information in a further statement.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): The representative of South Korea referred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a threat to peace and security, the same argument as was raised in the general debate. Once again I ask: What is the role of the 1,000 United States nuclear weapons that have existed for almost six decades? I ask him repeatedly, and he does not answer. But he refers to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as a threat. I totally and categorically reject his remarks as misleading the public and the participants in this meeting.

With regard to the threat on the Korean peninsula, I would like to briefly touch on three factors.

First, who created the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula? As I have said, it was the United States. In 1957, the United States brought in nuclear weapons and deployed them. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea has just made a nuclear deterrent, as a



now. Two weeks ago there was a meeting between the two parts of Korea. Now another meeting is scheduled. While that is going on, why are such sceptical remarks made, attacking the Democratic People's Republic of Korea?

With regard to the role of South Korea and United States nuclear weapons, South Korea came to know of the presence of nuclear weapons of the United States only in 1975 —

**The Chair:** I call the representative of Germany on a point of order.

**Mr. Hoffmann** (Germany): May I through you, Mr. Chair, ask the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea how it is that only a few minutes ago he requested that his country be referred to by its official name, but now refers to the Republic of Korea as South Korea? It is not easy to understand from my perspective. Maybe he can give some clarification.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I should call it again South Korea, because we are brothers. What should I call it? We are brothers. I need your clarification, Mr. Chair.

**The Chair:** The representative of Germany, on a point of order, asked how you could refer to the Republic of Korea as South Korea after you had complained that Canada referred to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as North Korea.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): That was because we are different countries, Canada and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea. But South Korea and North Korea — here I refer to the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as North Korea; no problem — are brothers.

**The Chair:** I call on the representative of the Republic of Korea on a point of order.

**Mr. Rim Kap-soo** (Republic of Korea): I ask my colleague from the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to please call us the Republic of Korea, not South Korea.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I thank the representative of South Korea, but still we are one nation. We are supposed to be one country.

**The Chair:** I call the representative of the Republic of Korea once again on a point of order on this issue.

**Mr. Rim Kap-soo** (Republic of Korea): We are sitting here in a United Nations meeting, and we are divided, so I say to the representative of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea: "Please call us 'the Republic of Korea'".

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I cannot say "Republic of Korea". I ask him to call the Democratic People's Republic of Korea "North Korea". It is fair.

**The Chair:** Just to be logical on the issue, you just a few minutes ago asked somebody to refer to your country with your official name. Now the representative of another country with its official name within the United Nations has asked you to refer to his country with the official name. So please could you also obey that?

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Let me say one thing, Mr. Chair. I am sorry for saying this wrong, but the Korean peninsula was divided. It was not our intention. There was a forced division. So we have regarded it as one country all the time; we have never regarded it as separated.

**The Chair:** But there is a reality within the United Nations. We have two Members from the Korean peninsula. We have the Republic of Korea and we have the Democratic People's Republic of Korea as Members, so of course we have to treat you as two separate nations, two separate Members in the United Nations. Whatever the perception in the national heritage may be is another matter, but in the United Nations we have two different countries.

Are you still going on with your statement in exercise of the right of reply, or did you exhaust it?

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): I will finish soon.

**The Chair:** Please do so.

**Mr. Ri Tong Li** (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Concerning the role of South Korea, it only came to know of the presence of United States nuclear weapons in 1975, in a parliamentary meeting in the United States, when discussing the military budget for 1976. South Korea was shocked; the entire Korean nation was shocked. That is the fact. So South Korea has no power to speak on the Korean nuclear issue. It is the one that allowed nuclear weapons, so it has no



Korea, but please agree between yourselves what you will do in that respect.

**Mr. Najafi** (Islamic Republic of Iran): I am sorry to take the floor again, but in view of the statements made by the representatives of France and the United Kingdom I am obliged to clarify some points.

First, with regard to the threatening statement made by the President of France, we are glad that France has corrected its statement, but it was very clear in the statement distributed by the media that it was a threatening statement, in clear violation of Article 2 of the Charter. We registered that issue officially within the United Nations.

The representative of France claimed that the issue of Iran is of international concern. I ask him to refer to the statements made constantly by 120 countries of the Non-Aligned Movement in support of Iran's right to a peaceful nuclear programme. The judgements of a few countries on the Security Council, which at the United Nations we sometimes describe as the Council of P-5, are not indicative of what is or is not the concern of the international community.

I ask the Committee simply to look at the statements of States members of the General Assembly, non-governmental organizations and various other international organizations, to discover the international community's real concern. It is the existence of nuclear weapons in the arsenals of nuclear-weapon States and their continued development and modernization of those nuclear weapons. That is the real concern.

There is an attempt to put up a smokescreen by trying to di-1(n)-14(s a)-T0.181J0.033 Twt6meateo(o11eu)-27-6(,)1(

which fell in our territorial waters. We responded. The situation almost spun out of control. Now in that same place a military exercise is again scheduled; a United States aircraft carrier, the

**The Chair:** I thank all the participants in this very interesting debate.

I remind delegations once again that the deadline for the submission of draft resolutions is 3 p.m. tomorrow, 14 October. I urge all delegations to make every effort

to meet the deadline, in order to afford the Secretariat the time to process the documents expeditiously.

I thank our interpreters for their endurance and flexibility this afternoon.

*Vjg"oggvki"tqug"cv"8032"r0o0"*