

weapons and is not carried out on the international level.

A number of member States of the Arab League believe that the Register does not fulfil their security needs because of its limited scope. Therefore, in the future, it will be up to the Member States to build confidence in the Register and to achieve more transparency. By virtue of General Assembly resolution 46/36 L, we believe that the scope of the Register needs to be expanded to include advanced conventional weapons and weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons, as well as advanced technology with military applications. That would make it more comprehensive and balanced and less discriminatory and would lead to more involvement by a larger number of participants.

The Middle East is a special region in that regard, which shows that there is no qualitative balance when it comes to weapons. For that reason, confidence and transparency can be achieved only in a comprehensive and balanced manner. Restricting this measure to seven types of weapons and neglecting the more advanced and destructive ones — such as weapons of mass destruction, in particular nuclear weapons — is unbalanced and incomprehensive and will not achieve the desired results.

Above all, we must bear in mind the situation in the Middle East and Israel's occupation and possession of the most lethal weapons. Moreover, Israel is the only State in the region that is not a party to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT). Yet it insists on ignoring the repeated calls by the international community that it adhere to the NPT and subject its nuclear facilities to the comprehensive safeguards of the International Atomic Energy Agency. Israel continues to ignore the repeated calls by the international community, while all countries of the world are aware that it possesses all those weapons, thereby undermining the credibility of international oversight and transparency mechanisms.

Our failure to expand the scope of the Register to include all types of weapons — including weapons of mass destruction, especially nuclear weapons — is not an effective means for early warning or confidence-building. That explains the decision of the League of Arab States group to abstain in the voting.

Mr. Aljowaily (Egypt): I wish to explain Egypt's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.47/Rev.1, entitled

"Compliance with non-proliferation, arms limitation and disarmament agreements and commitments".

Egypt has engaged constructively with the main sponsor, hoping to arrive at a text that would ensure a consensus on its provisions similar to the consensus that existed during the fifty-seventh session of the General Assembly. Unfortunately, and despite a few improvements in the text, the current version retains the language that had caused concern and had resulted in the changed pattern of adoption from consensus to vote.

The scope of the draft resolution extends beyond disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control agreements, as it refers to other commitments that are not clearly defined. The draft, in its preambular paragraphs, refers to compliance enforcement, which we believe is a matter that is subject to the provisions of each relevant disarmament and arms control agreement and the system that it creates, if any.

We in no way acknowledge the right of one or more States to enforce compliance by another State that is party to a treaty or an agreement. The appropriate framework is the United Nations and the authority and mechanisms provided for by the relevant agreements.

Additionally, paragraph 7 calls for "concerted action" to encourage compliance and to hold those not in compliance with such agreements accountable for their non-compliance in a manner consistent with the Charter of the United Nations. It is not clear which means are foreseen within the interpretation of "concerted action", nor which mechanisms are prescribed.

A similar concern relates to paragraph 9, whose language addresses the taking of action on non-compliance, but is not restricted to intergovernmental outcomes of the United Nations and other international organizations.

Finally, the draft resolution misses the most relevant aspect of underscoring the urgency of achieving the universality of multilateral disarmament and non-proliferation agreements. Universality, in our view, is the most appropriate way to ensure compliance, without distinctions between those who are committed and asked to comply fully and those who are not committed and enjoy the full benefits of not having to comply with any obligation. Getting

around this by using terminology such as encouraging adherence by all Member States, or noting the importance of universal adoption, as appropriate, is simply not enough. For all those reasons, Egypt abstained in the voting on the draft.

Mr. Hallak (Syrian Arab Republic) (*spoke in Arabic*): I wish to explain my delegation's vote on three of the draft resolutions that were adopted yesterday.

First, my delegation would like to reiterate its full support for the position adopted by the States members of the League of Arab States with regard to transparency in armaments. We wish to reaffirm our full support for the international objective of bringing about a world free of the use and the threat of use of force and governed by the purposes and principles enshrined in the Charter of the United Nations, which are based on peace, justice and equality. We affirm also our readiness to take part in any well-intentioned international efforts towards that end.

We would like to draw the attention of the First Committee to the fact that the draft resolution entitled "Transparency in armaments", contained in document

concerns of various States, the document still does not go far enough in urging the adoption of agreed bilateral or multilateral measures. That could result in broad interpretations for actions, including unilateral action, and could contradict the principles enshrined in the United Nations Charter, in particular Article 2.

Therefore, Ecuador, in abstaining in the voting on the draft resolution, recalls the existence of pending commitments and obligations in the context of nuclear disarmament. It hopes that in the future, the assessments of compliance or non-compliance with existing obligations in the area of disarmament, non-proliferation and arms control wi-445 T

that States have undertaken voluntarily and in exercise of their sovereignty.

We believe that in encouraging the compliance of other States with the disarmament, non-proliferation and arms limitation agreements to which they are parties, or in pursuing appropriate areas of cooperation

whole, including the Conference on Disarmament".

With this revision, it is the hope of the drafters that the draft resolution will be adopted without a vote.

Mr. Eloumni (Morocco) (spoke in French): No body and no instrument can ensure effective progress in the field of disarmament in the absence of genuine political will and a favourable international context. The adoption of the consensus rule in the Conference on Disarmament and in general is designed to garner the greatest possible support for the decisions adopted while enabling every Member State to bring its influence to bear on the decision-making process. However, it must be stressed that consensus should not represent an obstacle in this respect.

While respecting the legitimate and sovereign right of Member States to accept or reject proposed decisions, we believe that those States must demonstrate flexibility and a sense of responsibility. The Conference on Disarmament, which has in the past demonstrated its effectiveness and shown that it can succeed, remains the appropriate forum for progress to be made in negotiations on disarmament. To that end, the Conference must adopt a comprehensive, integrated and pragmatic approach.

The safety and security of a region is more than ever before closely interrelated with that of the rest of the world. Likewise, international security cannot be maintained and strengthened if legitimate national and regional security concerns are not integrated therein. It is therefore very important to undertake steps that take

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shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.52 was adopted.

The Chair: I now call on those delegations wishing to speak in explanation of position.

Mr. Suljuk Mustansar Tarar (Pakistan): My delegation is in full accord with the need to revitalize the work of the Conference on Disarmament and to advance multilateral disarmament negotiations. We therefore joined consensus on the draft resolution contained in document A/C.1/66/L.39, as orally revised.

Revitalization efforts would, however, remain

disarmament. Therefore, in our view, paragraph 5 of the draft resolution, which refers to options for a revitalization of the United Nations disarmament machinery, including the Conference on Disarmament, is nothing other than the convening of the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament.

In the view of the Islamic Republic of Iran, in taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations, the international community should avoid exclusive and discriminatory approaches and must take into consideration the security interests of all States.

Mr. Magalhães (Brazil): Brazil did not oppose draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.39, entitled "Revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations". Nevertheless, the delegation of Brazil wishes to express its apprehension concerning the wording of paragraph 8. That paragraph creates, if not encourages, the possibility of direct action by the First Committee on the reform of the Conference on Disarmament.

We should recall that the Conference on Disarmament was established by a special session of the General Assembly as part of a three-tiered machinery, also comprising the First Committee and the United Nations Disarmament Commission. During the high-level meeting and the follow-up plenary meeting States addressed all issues regarding disarmament and the machinery devoted to it, not just the functioning of the Conference on Disarmament. If we are to consider reforming the Conference, that must be part of an overall undertaking to review the United Nations disarmament machinery, in which case the fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament would be the most appropriate venue.

Mr. Shen Jian

public faith in its ability to really act as the preferred disarmament negotiating body. Should the CD fail to agree on and implement a comprehensive programme of work by the end of its 2012 session, the draft resolution notes the value of options being considered by the General Assembly next year in order to determine how best to move forward productively.

In the meantime, the draft resolution concludes by encouraging interested States to continue efforts in support of such negotiations, including through expert meetings on technical issues. It is our sincere hope that this draft resolution will serve to reinforce the Conference on Disarmament, to shift the current dynamics, and to provide an opportunity to restore consensus on a comprehensive programme of work.

The status quo, in our view, poses a much greater danger to the future of the CD than the modest, innovative effort represented by this draft resolution. Indeed, without such efforts, the CD risks irrelevance and a loss of confidence, as the Secretary-General himself has already noted with concern.

Canada would therefore very much hope that all Member States will join in supporting this draft resolution as a united statement of our collective commitment to advancing non-proliferation and disarmament.

Ms. Higgie (New Zealand): I have the honour to speak on behalf of the seven members of the New Agenda Coalition: Brazil, Egypt, Ireland, Mexico, South Africa, Sweden and my own country, New Zealand.

I wish to refer to the draft resolution submitted by the New Agenda Coalition, A/C.1/66/L.31/Rev.1, entitled "Towards a nuclear-weapon-free world: accelerating the implementation of disarmament commitments". The Committee will shortly take action on this draft resolution.

The New Agenda Coalition was founded in 1998 because of widespread dissatisfaction with the pace of nuclear disarmament. The members of the Coalition are committed to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT) in all its aspects. The draft resolution before the Committee today reaffirms that nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation are mutually reinforcing processes, and calls upon all States to comply fully with all commitments made

regarding nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation.

With the success of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the NPT, this year's draft resolution, like last year's, reflects the New Agenda Coalition's specific focus on ensuring that the nuclear disarmament commitments contained in the Conference's action plan are implemented in full. Of course, that does not mean that we are less committed to the plan's other elements, but there are other draft resolutions that deal with those elements.

The revised text of draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.31 was tabled on 21 October. The delay in its issuance was reg6nucleaee.Tw T\$0.000179 .Lideal n its m Tcs5 Tc s4 d

regarded as a significant step towards achieving our common goal of a world without nuclear weapons. We hope that the adoption of the draft resolution will bring us closer to that common goal of a nuclear-weapon-free world.

We strongly believe that the adoption of the draft resolution would positively contribute towards the ongoing direct consultations between ASEAN and the nuclear-weapon States with the aim of ensuring the

undermine Pakistan's security, Pakistan cannot therefore be a party to such a draft resolution.

We share the frustration expressed in the draft text about the years of stalemate in the Conference on Disarmament, but the stalemate is not due to the FMCT alone. In the interests of objectivity, it would have been appropriate to acknowledge the reasons for the decades of Conference on Disarmament deadlock on nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

It is evident that there are States in the Conference on Disarmament that are opposed to commencing negotiations on these three core items on its agenda. We have heard arguments by well-meaning delegations that Pakistan's concerns about the FMCT can be addressed during the negotiations. It is fair to ask why they maintain that the concerns of some major Powers on the other three core issues cannot also be addressed in the same manner.

If this logic holds, then the contentious elements pertaining to the issue of nuclear disarmament should not have prevented the commencement of negotiations on this single most important agenda item for the last 32 years. However, if that handful of States have legitimate security concerns, they should openly state their reasons for opposing the commencement of negotiations on the other three equally, if not more important, issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament. The fact that they have chosen not to do so raises serious questions regarding their motives and their commitment to nuclear disarmament and, indeed, to the work of the Conference itself.

Ms. Poroli (Argentina) (*spoke in Spanish*): My delegation would like to explain its vote on draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1.

The delegation of Argentina believes that the initiative of the Canadian delegation has merit. We therefore voted in favour of the draft at previous sessions of the General Assembly and will do so again this time around.

In that connection, we are in agreement with the spirit of this and other draft resolutions that attempt to contribute to revitalize the work of the Conference on Disarmament through the adoption and implementation of a programme of work leading to the start of substantive negotiations.

In that connection, Argentina stresses the role of the Conference on Disarmament as the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. We believe that the best way of protecting the national interests of each and every State is through the start of substantive negotiations on all agenda items.

Likewise, we believe that the commencement of negotiations on specific issues outside of the Conference on Disarmament, even though it may be within the United Nations framework, should be considered on a case-by-case basis, depending on advisability and merits.

In that context, Argentina has a positive view of draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1 in terms of substance, as it is in favour of the start of negotiations on a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices, because its conclusion will represent a substantive step forward towards nuclear disarmament.

However, we do not agree with the establishment

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The conference-servicing costs of the first session of the Preparatory Committee in Vienna, based on documentation requirements from the previous review cycle, including interpretation and the provision of summary records, are estimated at \$1,456,956. In addition, no conference-servicing requirements for conference room set-up, security, travel, subsistence allowance or substantive staff from the Office for

Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia,

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Angola, Antigua and Azerbaijan, Bahrain, Barbuda. Bahamas, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belize, Benin, Bhutan. Bolivia (Plurinational State Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Cuba, Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Ethiopia, Fiji, Ghana, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, India, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Malaysia, Madagascar, Maldives, Mali, Mexico, Mauritania. Mauritius. Mongolia, Morocco. Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Oman, Pakistan, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Qatar, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Solomon Islands, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkmenistan, Uganda, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Tanzania, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

None

Abstaining:

Albania, Andorra, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bosnia and Herzegovina, Bulgaria, Canada, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Greece, Hungary, Iceland, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Latvia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malta, Marshall Islands, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Montenegro, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Poland, Portugal, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, San Marino, Serbia, Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa,

Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Turkey, Ukraine, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland,

Mali, Malta, Mauritania, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Russian Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Syrian Arab Republic, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Republic of Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela Tanzania, (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Yemen, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea

Abstaining:

China, France, Georgia, India, Israel, Pakistan, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United States of America

Operative paragraph 1 was retained by 163 votes to 1, with 8 abstentions.

[Subsequently, the delegation of Georgia advised the Secretariat that it had intended to vote in favour.]

The Chair: We shall now take action on operative paragraph 9 of draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.31/Rev.1.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, China, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic,

Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark,
Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt,
El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji,
Finland, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada,
Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana,
Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia,
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In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Algeria, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cambodia, Cameroon, Canada, Cape Verde, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cuba, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, Ecuador, Egypt, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, Indonesia, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kenya, Kuwait, Kyrgyzstan, Lao People's Democratic Republic, Latvia, Lebanon, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Maldives, Mali, Malta, Mauritius, Mexico, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Myanmar, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Oman, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Senegal, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sudan,

Treaty)", was introduced by the representative of Indonesia on behalf of the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations and the States parties to the Treaty on the South-East Asia Nuclear-Weapon-Free Zone (Bangkok Treaty) at the 23rd meeting, on 28 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/66/L.38 and A/C.1/66/CRP.3/Rev.5.

The Chair: The sponsor of the draft resolution has expressed the wish that the draft resolution be adopted by the Committee without a vote. Unless I hear any objection, I shall take it that the Committee wishes to act accordingly.

Draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.38 was adopted.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1. A recorded vote has been requested. Separate, recorded votes have been requested on operative paragraphs 2 and 3.

I give the floor to the Secretary of the Committee.

Mr. Alasaniya (Secretary of the Committee): Draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", was introduced by the representative of Canada at the 20th meeting, on 25 October. The sponsors of the draft resolution are listed in document A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on operative paragraph 2 of draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain. Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil, Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Canada, Chile, Colombia, Comoros, Congo, Costa Rica, Côte d'Ivoire, Croatia, Cyprus, Czech Republic, Democratic Republic of the Congo, Denmark, Djibouti, Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland, France, Georgia, Germany, Ghana, Greece, Grenada, Guatemala, Guinea, Guinea-Bissau, Guyana, Haiti, Honduras, Hungary, Iceland, India, Iraq, Ireland, Italy, Jamaica, Japan, Kenya, Latvia, Lesotho, Liberia, Liechtenstein, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Madagascar, Malaysia, Mali. Malta. Marshall Maldives. Mauritius, Mexico, Micronesia (Federated States of), Monaco, Mongolia, Montenegro, Morocco, Mozambique, Nepal, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nicaragua, Niger, Nigeria, Norway, Panama, Papua New Guinea, Paraguay, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Qatar, Republic of Korea, Republic of Moldova, Romania. Federation, Saint Kitts and Nevis, Saint Lucia, Saint Vincent and the Grenadines, Samoa, San Marino, Saudi Arabia, Serbia, Sierra Leone, Singapore, Slovakia, Slovenia, Solomon Islands, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Suriname, Swaziland, Sweden, Switzerland, Tajikistan, Thailand, the former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia, Timor-Leste, Togo, Tonga, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, Turkmenistan, Tuvalu, Uganda, Ukraine, United Arab Emirates, United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, United Republic of Tanzania, United States of America, Uruguay, Uzbekistan, Venezuela (Bolivarian Republic of), Viet Nam, Zambia, Zimbabwe

Against:

Democratic People's Republic of Korea, Iran (Islamic Republic of), Pakistan

Abstaining:

Algeria, China, Ecuador, Egypt, Indonesia, Israel, Jordan, Kazakhstan, Kuwait, Lebanon, Mauritania, Myanmar, Oman, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Yemen

Operative paragraph 2 was retained by 149 votes to 3, with 16 abstentions.

The Chair: The Committee will now take action on operative paragraph 3 of draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1.

A recorded vote was taken.

In favour:

Afghanistan, Albania, Andorra, Angola, Antigua and Barbuda, Argentina, Armenia, Australia, Austria, Azerbaijan, Bahamas, Bahrain, Bangladesh, Barbados, Belarus, Belgium, Belize, Benin, Bhutan, Bolivia (Plurinational State of), Bosnia and Herzegovina, Botswana, Brazil,

Brunei Darussalam, Bulgaria, Burkina Faso,

Mauritania, Morocco, Oman, Qatar, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, Syrian Arab Republic, Tunisia, Yemen

Draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1 was adopted by 151 votes to 2, with 23 abstentions.

The Chair: I shall now give the floor to representatives who wish to speak in explanation or vote or position on the draft resolutions just adopted.

Mrs. Balaguer Labrada (Cuba) (spoke in Spanish): With regard draft resolution to A/C.1/66/L.37, entitled "Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty", Cuba has maintained its clear position against all types of nuclear-weapon tests, including those conducted using supercomputers and other sophisticated explosive methods. That is why Cuba has always voted in favour of the draft resolution on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT), which is introduced annually in the First Committee and which we have again supported this year.

Nevertheless, we believe that it is important to indicate that, with regard to its paragraph 5, the draft resolution distances itself from the highly technical character that it should have. Everyone knows about the inherent complexities of this delicate matter. The decisions made by the Security Council in that regard do not help to resolve the issue. We firmly believe that diplomacy and dialogue through peaceful means should continue with a view to reaching a long-term solution to the nuclear issue on the Korean peninsula.

Moreover, we reiterate our deep concern at the slow progress towards nuclear disarmament and the lack of progress by nuclear-weapon States in completely eliminating their nuclear arsenals. We hope that in the future the sponsors of the draft resolution will keep attention centred on relevant issues related to the CTBT and avoid including controversial elements that can be easily manipulated. That will facilitate efforts to build the necessary consensus on the issue.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I would like to explain my delegation's vote on two draft resolutions.

The first is A/C.1/66/L.37, on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty. My delegation voted in favour of the draft as a whole but would like to dissociate itself from paragraph 5, owing to the language used in the text and the way it has been drafted.

As explicitly stated in the United Nations Charter, the General Assembly is entitled to discuss independently any questions within the scope of the Charter and make recommendations. Therefore, in our view, there is no need to refer to the work of other organs of the United Nations in a resolution of the General Assembly, which was done in a completely different context.

I would also like to explain my delegation's position on draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices". My delegation abstained in the voting on the draft resolution as a whole and voted against its paragraph 2. Some countries, by proposing and adopting that draft resolution — which is on a certain subject being discussed in the Conference on Disarmament — are attempting to misuse the General Assembly as leverage to prioritize the items on the Conference's agenda. We believe that the new approach taken by the sponsors will cause the draft resolution on that issue to lose credibility.

We firmly believe that nuclear disarmament is the highest priority on the disarmament agenda, and the total elimination of nuclear weapons is the only absolute guarantee against the use or threat of use of such weapons. Accordingly, starting negotiations in the Conference on Disarmament on a phased programme for the complete elimination of nuclear weapons within a specified timeline should be the highest priority in negotiations on the items on the agenda of the Conference. That programme should include the conclusion of a nuclear-weapons convention in order to legally prohibit, once and for all, the possession, development, stockpiling and use or threat of use of nuclear weapons by any country and to provide for the destruction of such inhumane weapons.

The Islamic Republic of Iran strongly believes that a treaty to ban fissile material for nuclear-weapons purposes should not be developed as a mere non-proliferation instrument. We will never accept such an approach. In that context, the scope of such a treaty must cover past and future production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices and provide for their total destruction.

voted in favour of that draft resolution, as we believe that deepening substantive discussions on ways to increase the effectiveness of negative security assurances is an important issue. However, the draft resolution should not prejudge the discussions in the Conference on Disarmament. Japan strongly hopes that each member State of the Conference will demonstrate its flexibility and that the Conference will break the long-standing stalemate and advance its substantive work on the negotiations of a fissile material cut-off treaty and discussions on other important issues.

Mr. Cassidy (Indonesia): Indonesia would like to explain draft resolution its vote on A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1. On many occasions, Indonesia has stated clearly that the Conference on Disarmament should advance negotiations on a nuclear weapons convention and negative security assurances, the prevention of an arms race in outer space and a treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons in accordance with the Shannon mandate. We cannot overemphasize the importance of considering all of those four issues in a balanced manner.

Indonesia has traditionally been a supporter of the draft resolution that has been introduced by the delegation of Canada in previous years. We lent our support to previous such resolutions, as they clearly emphasized the importance of the Conference commencing negotiations on a fissile material cut-off treaty (FMCT) within its own framework.

Our delegation is not convinced that some new elements in this year's draft resolution will contribute positively to our common efforts to urge the Conference to meet its obligations as the sole multilateral negotiating forum for disarmament. At this stage, we are not convinced that any issue before the Conference should be taken outside the Conference before 2012. Moreover, we believe that establishing such a deadline for discussing FMCT issues outside the Conference will tip the already delicate balance between the progress made on non-proliferation and on nuclear disarmament issues.

By taking only the FMCT outside the Conference, as mentioned in the draft resolution — as if only certain countries in the Conference lacked the political will to move forward with the process — we see that, regrettably, there are also some countries in the Conference that show a lack of political will to move forward on the issue of nuclear disarmament, negative

security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space. We maintain our position that the Conference lacks political will not only on a fissile material cut-off treaty, but also on the issues of nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

For those reasons, our delegation decided to abstain in the voting on the draft resolution.

Mr. El Oumni (Morocco): Morocco firmly supports the early negotiation of a fissile material cutoff treaty in the framework of the Conference on Disarmament. Morocco further underlines that the Member States of the United Nations and members of the Conference should also give equal importance to the other core issues before the Conference, including nuclear disarmament. We call on all States to show political will and flexibility so as to allow the Conference to work on all core issues.

Mr. Kellerman (South Africa): South Africa has supported draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", on the basis of our long-standing commitment to the commencement of negotiations on such a treaty, which would fulfil both nuclear disarmament and nuclear non-proliferation objectives, and not because we subscribe to the notion that a fissile material cut-off treaty is the only item that is ripe for negotiations in the Conference.

We also supported paragraph 2 of the draft resolution, on the basis of our understanding that this option would be but one of the various proposals that could be considered in the First Committee at the next session in the context of revitalizing the work of the Conference on Disarmament and taking forward multilateral disarmament negotiations.

In addition to the option in the draft resolution, during the course of our deliberations this year many delegations highlighted their wish to address all disarmament issues in a comprehensive manner by convening a special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. My delegation views the convening of such a session as an important and viable option to be considered.

While we understand that the draft resolution deals exclusively with only one of the priority issues on the agenda of the Conference on Disarmament, we

Mr. Suljuk Mustansar Tarar (Pakistan): I would like to make explanations of vote on draft resolutions

the International Atomic Energy Agency's verification and safeguards regime. All those factors hamper efforts to create a nuclear-weapon-free zone in the Middle East and expose the region and the world to Israel's nuclear threat, without eliciting any international response whatsoever.

My delegation would also like to express its reservations with regard to all paragraphs of all draft resolutions that have been adopted to date, and those to be adopted, that provide for, or refer to, the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty.

Ms. Rahamimoff-Honig (Israel): We have two explanations of vote but, owing to time considerations, we will deliver only part of our explanation on the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty (CTBT) and will submit the full version to the Secretariat.

Israel decided to vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.37 because of the importance it attaches to the objectives of the CTBT. However, Israel has strong reservations regarding some of the wording in the sixth preambular paragraph and in paragraph 1, and cannot support them. It is Israel's long-standing position that the CTBT and the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of

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Mr. Farghal (Egypt): I take the floor to explain Egypt's vote on draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", of which Canada is the main sponsor.

Egypt firmly believes that the Conference on Disarmament is the sole multilateral negotiating forum on disarmament. We therefore oppose any potential encroachment on the Conference or any risk of possible duplication of its work. Egypt believes that the lack of political will is the obstacle preventing the Conference from adopting a comprehensive and balanced programme of work that would address its four core issues equally.

Egypt has always considered a treaty on fissile material as an important and crucial step towards nuclear disarmament, which we consider to be the top priority. In that principled context, Egypt has engaged

rules of customary international law as enshrined in the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, which provides that a State's acceptance, ratification or accession to a treaty is based on the principle of free consent. India's position on the NPT is well known. There is no question of India joining the NPT as a non-nuclear-weapon State. Nuclear weapons are an integral part of India's national security and will remain so pending global, verifiable and non-discriminatory nuclear disarmament.

Turning to draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.38, India went along with the adoption of the text without a vote. India respects the sovereign choice of non-nuclear-weapon States to establish nuclear-weapon-free zones on the basis of arrangements freely arrived at among the States of the region concerned. That principle is consistent with the provisions of the first special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament as well as with the 1999 Disarmament Commission guidelines referred to in the draft resolution.

India enjoys friendly and productive relations

commitments", sponsored by the New Agenda Coalition. I speak on behalf of France, the United Kingdom and my own Government.

We were unable to support the draft resolution, in part because it does not accurately reflect the commitments contained in the action plan of the 2010 Review Conference of the Parties to the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons. We take those commitments seriously and are actively working to fulfil them, as we demonstrated last summer at the Paris conference of the Permanent Five.

We regret that the draft resolution does not reflect an equitable balance among the three pillars of the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons (NPT): disarmament, non-proliferation and peaceful uses of nuclear energy. It does not adequately address compliance with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations and, in particular, neglects to mention the challenge to the NPT regime posed by Iran's failure to comply with its international obligations. We find that a critical omission.

We were also struck by the fact that it omits any reference to the negotiation of a fissile material cut-off treaty in the Conference on Disarmament, which the NPT Review Conference endorsed as the next immediate multilateral step towards nuclear disarmament.

While we voted against the draft resolution, we look forward to continuing our contacts with the countries in the New Agenda Coalition on issues of nuclear disarmament, non-proliferation and the peaceful uses of nuclear energy.

Mr. Magalhães (Brazil): The Brazilian delegation appreciates the efforts of the sponsor of draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1 in introducing changes that allowed us to vote in favour.

Brazil supports negotiations on a fissile material that generally imparts shared treaty our non-proliferation and disarmament goals alike. At the same time, negotiations on such a treaty should not be launched in whatever format under whatever conditions, especially if what is at risk is the future of the Conference on Disarmament as the single legitimate multilateral forum for disarmament negotiations. Furthermore, we should also strive to hold negotiations or substantive deliberations on the other three core issues of the agenda of the Conference,

namely, nuclear disarmament, negative security assurances and the prevention of an arms race in outer space.

Therefore, our support for the draft resolution should not be interpreted as encouraging the establishment in the future of parallel mechanisms to the Conference on Disarmament or allowing preparatory technical work to become actual pre-negotiations on a number of fundamental issues of the fissile material treaty, including its scope and verification procedures.

The very fact that this year we have competing draft resolutions on the paralysis in the Conference on Disarmament reinforces our conviction that the best and, ultimately, the effective solution is the convening of a fourth special session of the General Assembly devoted to disarmament. Under such a special Assembly session, better conditions would be set for a true revision of the United Nations disarmament machinery and for an update of the international community's common principles and objectives in arms control, non-proliferation and disarmament.

Mr. Ri Tong II (Democratic People's Republic of Korea): Concerning draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.40/Rev.1, entitled "Treaty banning the production of fissile material for nuclear weapons or other nuclear explosive devices", the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea voted against it.

During the group consultations on the draft resolution with Canada, the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea strongly expressed its concern. We all know what that concern is. However, the draft resolution has now been adopted, and that increases that concern. One of the key concerns stated by the delegation of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea and the majority of other delegations in the consultations was fear about many things. However, I will talk about just two aspects of the position of the Democratic People's Republic of Korea.

First, the draft resolution does not reflect the four core issues. It gives the strong impression that the fissile material cut-off treaty is the only issue on the Conference on Disarmament's agenda. Each of the other three core issues has its own interest for the appropriate group. Nuclear disarmament is one such issue. It has been on the agenda since the inception of the General Assembly, with the adoption of a

resolution touching on nuclear disarmament in 1946 (resolution 1 (I)). So it is a long-standing and overdue issue that should be negotiated and settled immediately. However, it is still set aside, and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea shares the common position of the countries of the Non-Aligned Movement on nuclear disarmament as a topmost priority.

Secondly, the draft resolution only demonstrates risky attempts by one country — Canada — to remove

the Convention. During the 14 years that this resolution has been submitted to the General Assembly, it has received increased support, and last year it reached its highest level of support, with 165 votes in favour, including many countries that are not party to the Mine-Ban Convention.

I would like to reiterate our call to all States, especially those who are not party to the Treaty, to vote in favour of the resolution, thus showing their support for the humanitarian principles of the Convention.

Salvador, Eritrea, Estonia, Ethiopia, Fiji, Finland,

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assistance to victims of anti-personnel mines. In that connection, it is fitting to point out the following.

First, between 1 April 2010 and 30 March 2011, the remarkable demining efforts undertaken by the Royal Armed Forces made possible the recovery and destruction of 1,171 anti-personnel mines, 6,799 anti-tank mines and 963 units of unexploded ordnance. Secondly, the Moroccan authorities have assumed responsibility for the treatment of victims and their medical, social and economic rehabilitation. Thirdly, Morocco provides demining support to countries in the region and maintains an ongoing dialogue with non-governmental organizations on achieving the Convention's objectives.

Since 2006, the Kingdom has voluntarily submitted a report under article 7 of the Convention. In the same spirit, Morocco regularly participates in meetings of States parties and in the Convention's review conferences. The adherence of the Kingdom of Morocco to the Ottawa Convention is a strategic objective that is linked to security requirements with regard to its territorial integrity.

Allow me to renew our country's support for the conclusion of an arms trade treaty. Morocco welcomes the progress made in the preparatory work for a conference that will make possible the adoption of the text of such a treaty. Morocco underscores the importance of taking into consideration the positions and legitimate concerns of all States and of ensuring the transparency of the process and full respect for the United Nations Charter.

Mr. Singh Gill (India): We would like to make two explanations of vote, on draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.4 and draft decision A/C.1/66/L.50.

Regarding draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.4, India supports the vision of a world free of the threat of anti-personnel land mines. Since 1997 India has discontinued the production of non-detectable anti-personnel mines and has observed the moratorium on their transfer. India is a party to Amended Protocol II of the Convention on Certain Conventional Weapons, which enshrines the approach of taking into

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Egypt views the Convention as lacking balance between the humanitarian concerns related to the production and use of anti-personnel landmines and their legitimate military use in border protection, particularly in countries with long borders.

Furthermore, the Convention does not impose any legal responsibility on States to remove anti-personnel mines they themselves have lain, particularly in their own territories, making it almost impossible for many States to meet their demining requirements on their own. That is particularly true in the case of Egypt, which still has millions of anti-personnel mines — remnants of the Second World War — on its territory. That serious concern is further exacerbated by the weak system of international cooperation set up by the Convention, which is still limited in its effect and highly dependent on the will of donor States.

The Ottawa Convention's weaknesses resulting from its lack of universality are a reflection of the lack of international consensus on its provisions, due in part to its having been concluded outside the United Nations. That reminds us of the value of concluding arms control and disarmament agreements within the context of the United Nations, and not outside of that framework.

Egypt abstained in the voting on draft decision A/C.1/66/L.50, submitted under the agenda sub-item "Towards an arms trade treaty: establishing common international standards for the import, export and transfer of conventional arms". The draft decision would resolve to hold the final session of the Preparatory Committee for the United Nations

treaty project has witnessed diverse views from States. That divergence has been manifest in the draft resolution adopted by the First Committee, but also during the three preparatory sessions for the United Nations Conference on the Arms Trade Treaty.

Pakistan fully shares the concerns that arise from the illegal trade in conventional weapons, particularly those that affect innocent civilians. But the approach being pursued by some States to restrict the scope of the proposed treaty to trading in arms is partial and lopsided.

Unifocal insistence on one dimension and the exclusion of the equally important issues of restraints on production, reduction in armaments and conventional arms control — the proposed parameters and criteria of the arms trade treaty — remain controversial. Those and other aspects of the proposed treaty were discussed in detail in the three sessions of the Preparatory Committee, with substantive agreements remaining unresolved.

The draft decision in A/C.1/66/L.50 refers to the conclusion of substantive work of the next Preparatory Committee session, in February 2012. In our view, that formulation does not accurately capture the factual work. It is our understanding that the next session of the Preparatory Committee will discuss and decide on organizational and procedural issues, not substantive ones. The substantive work was meant for the earlier three Preparatory Committee sessions and the July 2012 Conference, subject to a consensus and a comprehensive treaty on conventional weapons.

Ms. Karim (Singapore): I take the floor to explain my delegation's vote in favour of draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.4.

Singapore's position on anti-personnel landmines has been clear and open. As in past years, Singapore supports, and will continue to support, all initiatives against the indiscriminate use of anti-personnel landmines, especially when they are directed against innocent and defenceless civilians.

With that in mind, in May 1996, Singapore declared a two-year moratorium on the export of anti-personnel landmines without self-neutralizing mechanisms. In February 1998, Singapore expanded the moratorium to include all manner of anti-personnel landmines, not just those without self-neutralizing mechanisms, and extended the moratorium indefinitely.

We also support the work of the Convention by regularly attending the meetings of its States parties.

At the same time, like several other countries, Singapore firmly states that the legitimate security concerns and the right to self-defence of any State cannot be disregarded. A blanket ban on all types of anti-personnel landmines might therefore be counterproductive.

Singapore supports international efforts to resolve the humanitarian concerns about anti-personnel mines. We will continue to work with members of the international community to seek a durable and truly global solution.

Mr. Najafi (Islamic Republic of Iran): I have two explanations of vote.

The first concerns draft resolution A/C.1/66/L.4. My delegation shares the humanitarian concerns of the States parties to the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention that sponsored the draft resolution. Landmines have been used irresponsibly by military and armed groups in civil wars in some regions of the world, and consequently have claimed a great number of innocent lives, particularly among women and children. We welcome every effort to stop that trend.

However, the Anti-personnel Mine Ban Convention is focused mainly on humanitarian concerns, and does not adequately take into account the legitimate military requirements of many countries, particularly those with long land borders, that use landmines responsibly and in a limited manner to defend their territories. Due to the difficulties of monitoring extensive sensitive areas with established and permanent guard posts or effective warning systems, landmines unfortunately continue to be an effective means for those countries to ensure the minimum security requirements on their borders.

While this defensive device should be used under strict, established rules so as to protect civilians, more national and international efforts should also be made to explore new alternatives to landmines. Likewise, international cooperation should be promoted to speed up mine clearance activities for reducing civilian casualties and to establish sustainable indigenous demining programmes.

While appreciating the objectives of the draft resolution, my delegation, owing to its particular

Convinced that the work of the Preparatory Committee has resulted in significant progress towards the planned goal of an arms trade treaty, my delegation voted in favour of draft decision A/C.1/66/L.50. We are also convinced that the new Preparatory Committee session is essential in order to continue to make progress, while we understand that much work remains to be done.

My delegation deeply regrets that the draft decision was not adopted by consensus, since its wording in no way prejudges the outcome of the negotiations, their time frame or the documents submitted by the Chair of the Preparatory Committee.

The Chair: Concerning the question of the representative of Uruguay, the vote on draft decision A/C.1/66/L.50, on the arms trade treaty, was requested by the delegation of the Islamic Republic of Iran.

I now give the floor to the representative of the Islamic Republic of Iran on a point of order.